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Liability for Providing Hyperlinks to Copyright-Infringing 
Content:  International and Comparative Law Perspectives 
Jane C. Ginsburg* and Luke Ali Budiardjo** 
ABSTRACT 
Hyperlinking, at once an essential means of navigating the Internet, but also a 
frequent means to enable infringement of copyright, challenges courts to articulate 
the legal norms that underpin domestic and international copyright law, in order to 
ensure effective enforcement of exclusive rights on the one hand, while preserving 
open communication on the Internet on the other.  Several recent cases, primarily 
in the European Union, demonstrate the difficulties of enforcing the right of 
communication to the public (or, in U.S. copyright parlance, the right of public 
performance by transmission) against those who provide hyperlinks that effectively 
deliver infringing content to Internet users.  This Article will first address the 
international norms that domestic laws of states members to the multilateral 
copyright agreements must implement.  It next will explore how two of the most 
significant regional or national copyright regimes, the E.U. and the U.S., have 
coped with the question of linking, and then will consider the relationship of the 
emerging approaches to copyright infringement with national and regional laws 
instituting limited immunity for copyright infringements committed by internet 
service providers.  We will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the 
outcomes under U.S. and E.U. regimes, despite their apparently different 
approaches, in fact diverge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hyperlinks connect Internet users to content residing on the Internet.  “Simple” 
links take the user to a website’s home page from which she may navigate to 
specific works; “deep” and “in-line” or “framing” links bring the user directly to 
the content the user seeks, in the latter case by presenting the content “framed” by 
the website the user first consulted to locate the requested works.1  Linking, at once 
an essential means of navigating the Internet, but also a frequent means to enable 
infringement of copyright, challenges courts to articulate the legal norms that 
underpin domestic and international copyright law, in order to ensure effective 
enforcement of exclusive rights on the one hand, while preserving open 
communication on the Internet on the other.  Several recent cases, primarily in the 
European Union, demonstrate the difficulties of enforcing the right of 
communication to the public (or, in U.S. copyright parlance, the right of public 
performance by transmission) against those who provide hyperlinks that effectively 
deliver infringing content to Internet users.  This Article will first address the 
international norms that domestic laws of states members to the multilateral 
copyright agreements must implement.  It next will explore how two of the most 
significant regional or national copyright regimes, the E.U and the U.S., have coped 
with the question of linking, and then will consider the relationship of the emerging 
approaches to copyright infringement with national and regional laws instituting 
limited immunity for copyright infringements committed by Internet service 
providers.  We will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the 
outcomes under U.S. and E.U. regimes, despite their apparently different 
approaches, in fact converge. 
I. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
Because hyperlinks enable users to access content residing on the Internet, one 
may conceptualize the provision of a hyperlink as a form of making works 
 
 1. The terms “in-line linking” and “framing” are conceptually very similar.  Generally, “in-line 
linking” or “embedded linking” refers to the process of importing a piece of content from another 
website through a hyperlink.  “Framing” is a more specific term that refers to the combination of 
materials from different sources on a single website through in-line hyperlinks, but may refer 
specifically to uses in which the imported content is presented independently through a “gateway” or 
“independently scrollable frame[].”  See Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at 
Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297–99 (2001).  For clarity, this Article will use the term 
“in-line linking” to refer to both practices. 
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available to the public.  The 1996 WIPO Copyright treaties introduced the “making 
available” right in order to modernize the exclusive right of communication to the 
public under the Berne Convention,2 to make it suitable for implementation in the 
digital environment.3  The Berne Convention includes rights of communication to 
the public by primary and secondary transmission by wired and wireless means, but 
does not consolidate these rights into a single comprehensive and coherent article.  
Rather, the 1971 Paris text disperses the communication to the public right across a 
variety of dispositions, leaving several gaps both as to subject matter covered by 
the right, and as to the exclusive rights conferred.  Despite those gaps, it is clear 
that the communication to the public right reaches acts of both initial and re-
communication of works; article 11bis, for example, concerns third parties’ free-to-
air and wired retransmissions of broadcasts of protected works.4  It is, arguably, 
less clear that the Berne Convention’s right of communication to the public 
extended to individualized “pull” technologies, in addition to transmissions 
simultaneously communicated to the public (“push” technologies).5 
Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) fills in the Berne Convention 
blanks with respect both to subject matter and to scope of the communication to the 
public right.6  All initial and subsequent transmissions of works of authorship to the 
public come within the scope of the exclusive right.  Article 8 contributes further 
detail to the communication to the public right, by specifying that the right of 
communication to the public includes a right of “making available to the public of 
[literary and artistic] works in such a way that members of the public may access 
those works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”7  This right 
targets individualized on-demand (“pull”) communications (by any technical 
means), for it makes clear that the members of the public may be separated both in 
space and in time.8  The WCT does not define the “public” to whom the works are 
 
 2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force in 
the United States Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter, Berne Convention]. 
 3. Mihaly Ficsor, The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture—Copyright for the Digital Era: 
The WIPO “Internet” Treaties, 21 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 197, 209–11 (1997) (noting that the “making 
available” provision in the WIPO Copyright Treaty was meant in part to “clarif[y]” the concepts of 
distribution and communication to the public in the context of digital transmissions). 
 4. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 11bis(1)(ii) (giving authors the exclusive right of 
authorizing “any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, 
when this communication is made by an organization other than the original one”). 
 5. See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶¶ 12.47-12.51 (2006). 
 6. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter, WCT].  
Similar solutions were adopted in the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, arts. 10 & 14, Dec. 
20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter, WPPT]. 
 7. WCT, supra note 6, art. 8. 
 8. JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES ON COPYRIGHT: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE WCT, THE WPPT, AND THE BTAP ¶ 7.8.36 (2015) (noting that Art. 8 WCT 
“cover[s] all situations involving an individual time and place of access” including both “pull-
technology, which requires the user to ‘demand’ that a work be transmitted to his terminal,” and “push-
technology, by which the works are ‘pushed’ to the email address of the user and may be accessed by 
him at this address at any time and from any place”). 
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made available, but it states that the “public” is composed of “members,” and, thus 
implies that the “public” need not be populous, although the greater the numbers to 
whom a work is made available, the more apparent the conclusion that the making 
available was to “the public.” 9   Certainly, simply offering the work on an 
undiscriminating basis, so that any member of the general public may access the 
work, should come within the scope of the right.10  Even a more narrowly defined 
class of intended recipients, such as the fans of a particular musician, or students of 
twentieth-century photorealist painting, may appeal to an audience potentially too 
large for a “family circle” or similar exclusion. 
It is not necessary that the offer be accepted:  as the phrase “may access” 
establishes, “making available” embraces incipient as well as effected 
communications. 11   Similarly, because the right targets individualized 
transmissions, the relevant measure is not whether the number of recipients 
exceeds that of a family circle, but whether the number of persons to whom access 
to the content is offered exceeds that of a family circle.  The work is “made 
available” even if only one member of that public, or indeed none, in fact demands 
the work’s delivery. 
The technological means of “making available” are irrelevant; unlike the Berne 
Convention articles differentiating wired and wireless transmissions, WCT article 8 
is expressed in technologically neutral terms. 12  Moreover, member states may 
comply with the right either through local communication rights, or, for those 
 
 9. Id. at ¶ 7.8.39 (“If works are made available in the framework of a social network, a chat 
group, or mailing list, the question of whether the works are made available ‘to the public’ depends on 
the characteristics of the groups of persons to whom the works are made available and on the definition 
of ‘public’ under the relevant national law . . . . In most cases, such groups will constitute a ‘public’ . . . 
[but] the electronic mailing of a work . . . to one particular person does not constitute making available 
‘to the public’ . . . .”). 
 10. Id. at ¶ 7.8.38 (“Beyond doubt, the making available of works on a home page or any server 
that may even be accessed through broader networks, in particular over the internet, is an act of making 
available to the public.”). 
 11. Memorandum Prepared by the Chairman of the Committees of Experts, ¶ 10.10, 
CRNR/DC/4, (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter, WCT Basic Proposal I], in WIPO, 1 Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, at 204 (1996), 
https://perma.cc/WF32-AK6X (“The relevant act is the making available of the work by providing 
access to it. What counts is the initial act of making the work available, not the mere provision of server 
space, communication connections, or facilities for the carriage and routing of signals.  It is irrelevant 
whether copies are available for the user or whether the work is simply made perceptible to, and thus 
usable by, the user.”); REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at 137 (noting that “the mere 
wording of Article 8, part 2 WCT” shows that the “act of making available to the public only needs to 
allow that members of the public ‘may access’ the work” and that, accordingly, “users do not necessarily 
need to access the work in order to trigger the making available right”) (emphasis omitted). 
 12. See WCT Basic Proposal I, supra note 11, at ¶ 10.14 (“The technology used may be analog or 
digital, and it may be based on electromagnetic waves or guided optical beams.  The use of the non-
restrictive term ‘any’ in front of the word ‘communication’ in [Article 8], and in certain provisions of 
the Berne Convention, emphasizes the breadth of the act of communication.”); Ficsor, supra note 3, at 
210 (noting that the “making available” right is “described in a neutral way, free from specific legal 
characterization (for example, as making available a work to the public by wire or by wireless means, 
for access); [is not] technology-specific and, at the same time, [expresses] the interactive nature of 
digital transmissions”); REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at 138 (“The technical means of 
making the work available are irrelevant.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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countries who have applied the distribution right to temporary digital copies, 
through the right to distribute copies, as the United States urged during the drafting 
period.13  In adopting what came to be known as the “umbrella solution,” allowing 
member states to implement the making available right through any domestic law 
exclusive right or combination of them, the drafters opted for an approach of 
juridical as well as technological neutrality.14 
As an instance of the communication to the public right, the scope of the making 
available right’s coverage of on-demand access encompasses both initial and 
secondary transmissions.15  It thus covers both the provision of direct access and at 
least certain forms of indirect access to literary and artistic works.  The extent to 
which the making available right reaches intermediated on-demand access to 
works, particularly via hyperlinks, requires examination.  Consider the following 
scenarios:  (1) a user enters the URL of a website in order to access works stored on 
the site.  Here, the user directly contacts the initial source of the transmission of the 
requested content.  In the second two scenarios, by contrast, the user contacts an 
intermediary who will direct her to a third-party source site from which the 
requested content will be transmitted.  (2) A website aggregates links to other 
websites from which users can download unauthorized copies of recorded music.  
Some links are identified by the name of the music file; clicking on these links 
takes the user directly to another website and automatically downloads the named 
file from that third-party website to the user’s hard drive.  (3) Other links are 
identified by the names of the third-party websites; clicking on these sends the user 
to the named website, from which she may navigate to and elect to download a 
variety of files.  In (3), the linking site does not directly send digital files of the 
recorded music to users who access the linked-to site. 
From the user’s point of view, the experience of acquiring the file in (1) and (2) 
is the same; either way, she contacts the first site and receives the file without the 
apparent further intervention of another website operator.  In (3), the user knows 
 
 13. See WIPO, 2 Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions, ¶ 301, at 675 (1996), https://perma.cc/E5KL-XCSF [hereinafter, 1996 Records] 
(“[The United States delegation] stressed the understanding . . . that [the new “making available” right] 
might be implemented in national legislation through application of any particular exclusive right, . . . as 
long as the acts described in those Articles were covered by such rights.”). 
 14. For extensive discussion of the “umbrella solution,” by the coiner of the term, see MIHALY 
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 204-10 (2002). 
 15. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at 133 (“[A]ny new act of making available a 
work via the internet, for example through a separate upload or link on a second website to the one 
where the work was originally made available, or through a search engine, represents a new act of 
making available to the public.”) (citations omitted); Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale 
(ALAI), Opinion on the criterion “New Public”, developed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), put in the context of making available and communication to the public, 9 (Sept. 17, 
2014) [hereinafter, ALAI New Public Opinion], https://perma.cc/ZN2Y-U8TZ (“Article 11bis(1)(ii) of 
the Berne Convention brings within the general scope of the communication to the public right 
secondary transmissions made by a different communication entity; the text may be said to support a 
requirement of a new communicator in the case of a new transmission of a prior broadcast.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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she is being taken to another site from which she may download files of recorded 
music.  In all three scenarios, the websites on which the content is stored are 
making works available to the public; whether the members of the public enter the 
site’s URL to gain access to the works directly from the source site, or the members 
of the public access the works on the source site through the intermediary of a link, 
either way the source site will be communicating the works to members of the 
public.  But, in cases (2) and (3), is the first-accessed site, by providing a link that 
routes the user directly (2) or indirectly (3) to the content residing on the source 
site, also “making [the files] available” to the members of the public who, through 
the intermediary of the link, contact the source site?  Does it matter whether the 
user knows that the file is coming from the site she contacted, or from some other 
site?  Put another way, does it matter that in (2) the content appears to the user to be 
coming from the linking site, while in (3) it is apparent that the linked-to site is 
offering the content? 
The text of the Article 8 (and Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”)) “making available” right may supply an answer.16  
It gives authors the exclusive right of allowing members of the public to access 
literary and artistic works (and recorded performances) “from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”  The “place” contemplated most likely refers to the 
physical place where the member of the public is located (for example, at home) 
when she requests the content.  The text also implies that the “place” is one to 
which the content will be sent, and that “place” might be anywhere the member of 
the public and her receiving device (for example, a cell phone, notebook, or laptop 
computer) are located.  But the text might also be read to refer to the networked 
“place,” e.g., website, that the user contacts in order to gain access to the work.17  
Applying that interpretation, in scenario (3), the connection between accessing the 
first site and the communication of the work may be too attenuated, because the 
user knows that the site from which she is receiving the work is no longer the site 
she first contacted.18  The linked-to site becomes the place from which the user 
chooses to access the work, rather than the linking site.  In scenario (2), by contrast, 
the place from which the user appears to be accessing the music is the site the user 
 
 16. The following analysis elaborates on an approach proposed in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, 
supra note 5, at ¶¶ 12.60-12.61. 
 17. Nothing in the 1996 Records indicates that the language “from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them” received special attention, apart from general endorsement of its 
adaptability to digital communications.  See 1996 Records, supra note 12. 
 18. This does not mean that the linking site incurs no liability:  if the linker is willfully directing 
users to an infringing source, it may be liable for facilitating copyright infringement.  Arguably the 
direction in the Berne Convention arts. 11bis, 11ter, and 14, and WCT art. 8 that authors “shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing” communications to the public anticipates that member states will provide 
redress for facilitation (effectively, unauthorized authorization) of infringement, whether on the basis of 
direct or indirect liability.  The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently brought acts of 
facilitation of infringement within the scope of direct liability.  See section II.A, infra.  For consideration 
of the liability of a site that links to a third-party site that in turn links to an infringing site, see Pekka 
Savola, EU Copyright Liability for Internet Linking, J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. INFORMATION TECH. & E-
COMMERCE L, 2017 at 4.1 (discussing the ambiguity in the GS Media case whether a “linker [is] also 
responsible for linking . . . to websites which include . . . clickable links to infringing material”). 
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initially contacted, which is the only site she chose.  Accordingly, though the 
ultimate source of the communication is not the linker’s site, the linker will be 
making the work available to a user who has “chosen” to access the content from 
the linker’s site.19 
Under this approach, then, the WCT “making available” right will reach certain, 
but not all, acts of secondary communication of content residing on third-party 
websites.  Notably, this interpretation of the WCT views the act of making 
available from an economic perspective:  the site from which the user chooses to 
access the content reaps the economic benefits of the user’s choice, for example, by 
exposing her to that site’s advertising, or simply by prolonging the user’s visit to 
that website.20  This interpretation of the WCT also comports with a functional 
view:  the operation “feels” to the user as if she is receiving the content from the 
intermediary.21 
 
 19. While this interpretation might suggest that the website from which the content is in fact 
(despite appearances) emanating is not “making [that content] available” to the user who obtains the 
content via a deep or in-line link, it will not matter to the source site’s liability for “making available” 
that some content recipients are not aware of the source:  so long as the source website can be contacted 
directly or via a simple link, it is still making content available to users in general. 
 20. Some commentators have noted that the CJEU’s interpretation of Directive 2001/29/EC 
(which implements the art. 8 WCT “making available” right in the EU) takes a similar “economic” 
approach, focusing not on “the legal monopoly of the authors,” but on “whether the [defendant] 
economically exploits the copyright protected subject matter.”  Matthias Leistner, Europe’s Copyright 
Law Decade: Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice and Policy Perspectives, 51 COMMON 
MARKET L. REV. 559, 570 (2014) (emphasis supplied).  Cf. REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, 
at 133 (noting that “[t]he right of [making available] to the public . . . must be interpreted according to 
its purpose, [which is] to cover important acts of exploitation [of] the [copyright holder’s] exclusive 
right” and that because the aim of the “making available” provision is “to grant the author the right to 
exploit his work by way of communication to the public,” the right should not be limited to allow actors 
to design business models “conceived to avoid the application of these rights by using certain technical 
designs”); FICSOR, supra note 14, at 205 (“[I]n those cases where digital delivery resulting in copies 
becomes a normal way of exploiting works and other productions, it will not be sufficient to grant 
owners of rights a simple right to remuneration . . . . In such a case, an exclusive right of authorization 
should be granted.”). 
 21. Some WCT signatories have declined to adopt this functional view, and have refused to 
impose direct liability on such intermediary actors who do not actually “store and serve” the content to 
the user.  See Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843–45 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (albeit without 
reference to the WCT).  See also infra section III.A. (discussing the “server rule” adopted in the U.S.).  
For example, in the U.S., a site which provides a hyperlink which, when clicked, causes the automatic 
download of an infringing file from a third-party website cannot incur direct copyright liability, even if 
the user may not understand that the linking site is not actually providing the work.  See id.  However, 
the travaux préparatoires of the WCT indicate that the “relevant act is the making available of the work 
by providing access to it” and that technical processes like “the mere provision of server space” are less 
relevant than the “initial act of making the work available.”  WCT Basic Proposal I, supra note 11, at ¶ 
10.10 (emphasis supplied).  Therefore, these technically-based approaches to hyperlinking liability may 
not be wholly consistent with the policy behind the “making available” right.  See infra section III.A.3.c. 
(discussing the tension between the “making available” right and the current state of U.S. law). 
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II. E.U. LAW ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING 
The European Union has incorporated the WCT making available right verbatim 
in article 3(2) of the 2001 Information Society Directive.22  Article 3 covers the 
right of communication to the public.  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) in Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, held hyperlinking to be a form of 
“making available,” even though providing a link simply furnishes a means to 
access a work offered from a third-party site. 23   That the linker may be an 
intermediary, and that no communication will result unless the user clicks on the 
link, did not dissuade the court from holding links within the ambit of “making 
available”:   
 
[T]he provision, on a website, of clickable links to protected works published without any access 
restrictions on another site, affords users of the first site direct access to those works. . . . [A] 
work is made available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access 
it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity).
24
 
 
That said, the CJEU in fact curtailed the reach of the making available right with 
respect to hyperlinks by further holding that even though hyperlinks are a 
“communication to the public,” when hyperlinks offer to recommunicate content 
already available on another website, the link, to be actionable, must either reach 
the public by a different technological means than the initial communication, or 
must reach a “new public” not contemplated by the right holder in authorizing the 
initial communication. 25   Because the Court determined that all Internet users 
constituted the same “public,” at least when the originating site did not limit access 
to the content, the “new public” criterion as applied in Svensson effectively 
excluded links to unrestricted websites from the scope of the communication-to-
the-public right.  In a subsequent decision, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media 
Netherlands BV, involving the provision of links to an unlawful source, the Court 
imposed an additional, and subjective, criterion of knowledge of the illicit character 
 
 22. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L 
167) 1 [hereinafter, Directive 2001/29]. 
 23. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, at ¶ 20 (Feb. 13, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE. 
 24. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20: 
18  In the circumstances of this case, it must be observed that the provision, on a website, of 
clickable links to protected works published without any access restrictions on another site, 
affords users of the first site direct access to those works. 
19  As is apparent from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, for there to be an ‘act of 
communication’, it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a public in such a 
way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they avail 
themselves of that opportunity (see, by analogy, Case C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, 
paragraph 43). 
20  It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, the 
provision of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and, 
therefore, an ‘act of communication’, within the meaning of that provision. 
 25. Id. at ¶ 24. 
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of the targeted site.26  In both cases, copyright scholars have criticized the Court’s 
reasoning,27 notably because the “new public” criterion lacks legal basis in the 
international copyright treaties. 28   Nonetheless, the knowledge condition in 
particular, however debatable, avoided a potentially oppressive application of 
copyright to the great majority of Internet users who are unaware that the sites to 
which they may be supplying links are illicit. 
As a result of these decisions, it appeared that in the case of secondary 
communications, at least via hyperlinks, the Court of Justice, by imposing a 
knowledge criterion, was calling into question the nature of the communication to 
the public right (and therefore of copyright in general).  After all, proof of a 
violation of a “true” property right does not require the right holder to establish that 
the defendant knew that he was violating an exclusive right.  The court’s later 
decisions, however, suggest that the Court has gradually achieved a European 
harmonization of the law on derivative liability (i.e., liability in the second degree) 
for violation of the right of communication to the public by hyperlinking and other 
indirect means of providing access to protected works.29  Moreover, harmonization 
at the E.U. level was necessary given both the lack of uniformity regarding 
secondary liability across the national laws of the member states,30 and the growing 
economic importance of furnishing the means to access infringing sources (without 
serving as the initial source of the infringing communication).31 
 
 26. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 55 (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6. 
 27. See, e.g., Pierre Sirinelli, Alexandra Bensamoun & Josée-Anne Benazeraf, Le droit de 
communication au public, 251 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR [RIDA] 207 (2017); 
Matthias Leistner, Closing the Book on Hyperlinks: A Brief Outline of the CJEU’s Caselaw and 
Proposal for European Legislative Reform, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [EIPR] 327 (2017); P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz & Sam C. van Velze, Communication to a New Public? Three Reasons Why EU Copyright 
Law Can Do Without a ‘New Public’ (July 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
https://perma.cc/JAM8-4V9X); ALAI New Public Opinion, supra note 15; ALAI, Opinion of ALAI’s 
Executive Committee on the Right of communication to the public; the Advocate General’s Opinions in 
Filmspeler Case C-527/15 and Ziggo Case C-610/15 (Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/3MQ3-VH42. 
 28. See ALAI New Public Opinion, supra note 15. 
 29. Cf. Alain Strowel, Note on Svensson, 2014/3-4 AUTEURS & MEDIA 224, 232 (raising the 
question of a “complete harmonization of the right of communication to the public.”). 
 30. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV 
and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 3 (June 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J (“The European 
Commission, whose opinion appears to me to be shared by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, contends that liability for sites of this type is a matter of copyright application, which 
can be resolved not at the level of EU law but under the domestic legal systems of the Member States.  
Such an approach would, however, mean that liability, and ultimately the scope of the copyright holders’ 
rights, would depend on the very divergent solutions adopted under the different national legal systems.  
That would undermine the objective of EU legislation in the relatively abundant field of copyright, 
which is precisely to harmonise the scope of the rights enjoyed by authors and other rightholders within 
the single market.  That is why the answer to the problems raised in the present case must, in my view, 
be sought rather in EU law.”).  See also Birgit Clark & Julia Dickenson, Theseus and the Labyrinth? An 
Overview of “Communication to the Public” Under EU Copyright Law, 39 EIPR 265, 277 (2017) 
(adverting to “real challenges of not having a common conception of secondary liability within the EU 
legal framework”). 
 31. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), at recitals 37-39 
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A. HARMONIZATION OF THE LAW OF COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC AS 
APPLIED TO THE FACILITATION OF INFRINGEMENT BY HYPERLINKING AND 
OTHER MEANS 
Both of the CJEU’s later cases concerned facilitation of illicit communications 
to the public:  in Stichting Brein v. Wullums (Filmspeler)32 through the sale of a 
device which connected to a television screen and which was supplied with 
hyperlinks pointing to illicit Internet streaming sites, and in Stichting Brein v. 
Ziggo 33  through the services of The Pirate Bay (“TPB”), a P2P BitTorrent 
indexation site that enabled Internet users to locate audiovisual works in the hard 
disks of other participants in the P2P network and to make unauthorized copies.34  
In both cases, the Court distinguished between an act of communication to the 
public and “[t]he mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication [which] does not in itself amount to communication within the 
meaning of this Directive.” 35   In both cases, the decisions turned on the 
characterization of an act of communication, all subsequent elements of a 
secondary communication to the public having been established:  that the 
communication was made to (1) a “public” composed of an indeterminate but fairly 
large number of recipients; (2) a “new public” not taken into account by the right 
owner when it initially communicated the work to the public (defendants in both 
cases were facilitating access to infringing locations, thus the right owner did not 
envision a “public” accessing the work from those locations); and (3) defendants’ 
knowledge of the illicit character of the source of the communication (websites in 
Filmspeler; “sharing” files of the P2P network’s participants in Ziggo). 
The “new public” criterion as applied in Svensson protected all those who 
supplied links (of any kind, including framing links) to a site authorized by the 
copyright owner, whom the Court deemed to have taken all Internet users into 
account at the time of the first unrestricted posting of the work to the site.  But, as 
the Court recognized in Filmspeler, the notion of an accounted-for public makes no 
 
[hereinafter, 2016 Proposal].  See also Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay International, 2011 E.C.R. I-
6011, I-6073, available at https://perma.cc/TNV2-A5AW (online auctions platform bringing together 
buyers and sellers of counterfeit perfumes); Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2467, available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT (AdWords, 
links to sites selling infringing imitations of Vuitton bags). 
 32. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems [hereinafter, Filmspeler] (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. 
 33. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV (June 14, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J. 
 34. Ziggo concerned a request under art. 8 of the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 to direct an access 
provider to block access to The Pirate Bay website.  Article 8, titled “Sanctions and remedies,” provides, 
at ¶ 3: 
Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right. 
Ziggo, as an access provider, was an intermediary within the scope of art. 8, and its services were 
used by The Pirate Bay, but it was necessary to establish that TPB was violating the right of 
communication to the public. 
 35. Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, at recital 27. 
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sense when the source toward which the links point is illicit.36  Nonetheless, the 
risk of finding a vast number of Internet users to be copyright infringers led the 
Court in GS Media to seek a “fair balance” that enabled it to engraft onto the “new 
public” requirement an additional criterion of knowledge that the linked-to content 
was infringing. 37   By contrast, in Filmspeler and Ziggo, by transposing the 
knowledge criterion to the first stage of the analysis, in order to determine whether, 
as a result of the “deliberate character of [its] intervention,”38 the defendant had 
committed an act of communication in the first place, the Court achieved the 
balance sought in GS Media.  Inquiry into defendant’s deliberate intervention 
allowed the court to distinguish the unconscious acts of simple Internet users, 
without requiring recourse to the increasingly complex concept of a “new public” 
in order to avoid undesirable consequences.  
In Filmspeler the Court evoked the “essential role” of the person who effects an 
act of communication, together with that person’s intentional intervention, in 
making a protected work accessible. 39   But “essential” does not mean 
“indispensable.”  In fact, even if the purchasers of the Filmspeler set top box could 
have obtained unauthorized access to the works by other means, the knowing 
facilitation of access sufficed for the commission of an act of communication (as 
opposed to the simple furnishing of the means to make a communication).  The 
Court emphasized that the defendant had loaded his media player with links to 
illicit sites “with full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct.”40  Because 
the pre-installed links, once activated by the multimedia player’s users, “offer its 
users direct access to protected works without the consent of the copyright 
 
 36. See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 48 (“However, the same finding cannot be deduced from 
those judgments failing such an authorisation.”). 
 37. See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶¶ 44–48 (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6. 
 38. Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26. 
 39. See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31 (“Amongst those criteria, the Court has emphasised, 
above all, the essential role played by the user.  The user makes an act of communication when he 
intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give access to a protected work to his 
customers and does so, in particular, where, in the absence of that intervention, his customers would not, 
in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 May 2016, Reha 
Training, C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 46, and of 8 September 2016, GS Media, C-160/15, 
EU:C:2016:644, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited)”) (emphasis supplied). 
 40. See id. at ¶ 41 (“In the same way, it must be held that the present case does not concern a 
situation of the ‘mere’ provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication.  As the 
Advocate General noted in paragraphs 53 and 54 of his opinion, Mr Wullems, with full knowledge of the 
consequences of his conduct, pre-installs onto the ‘filmspeler’ multimedia player that he markets add-
ons that specifically enable purchasers to have access to protected works published—without the 
consent of the copyright holders of those works—on streaming websites and enable those purchasers to 
watch those works on their television screens (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 December 2006, SGAE, 
C-306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 42).  That intervention enabling a direct link to be established 
between websites broadcasting counterfeit works and purchasers of the multimedia player, without 
which the purchasers would find it difficult to benefit from those protected works, is quite different from 
the mere provision of physical facilities, referred to in recital 27 of Directive 2001/29.  In that regard, it 
is clear from the observations presented to the Court that the streaming websites at issue in the main 
proceedings are not readily identifiable by the public and the majority of them change frequently.”) 
(emphasis supplied). 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
2018] LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT 165 
holders,” the Court ruled that supplying the device “must be regarded as an act of 
communication within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”41 
As for the “new public” criterion, after citing its decision in GS Media,42 the 
Court simply observed:  “In the present case, it is common ground that the sale of 
the ‘filmerspeler’ [sic] multimedia player was made in full knowledge of the fact 
that the add-ons containing hyperlinks pre-installed on that player gave access to 
works published illegally on the internet.”43 
In Ziggo, the Court reinforced Filmspeler’s lesson:  those who knowingly 
facilitate unauthorized access to protected works play an “essential role” in their 
communication, and therefore themselves commit an act of communication.44  As 
in Filmspeler, the Court emphasized that TPB’s administrators “intervene, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected 
 
 41. See id. at ¶ 42 (“Consequently, it must be held that the provision of a multimedia player such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings enables, in view of the add-ons pre-installed on it, access via 
structured menus to links that those add-ons which, when activated by the remote control of that 
multimedia player, offer its users direct access to protected works without the consent of the copyright 
holders and must be regarded as an act of communication within the meaning of Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2001/29.") (emphasis supplied).  
 42. See id. at ¶ 49. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 50.  In the same paragraph, the Court also observes that Filmspeler’s conduct justified 
the presumption of knowledge which, per GS Media, flows from the lucrative character of the link:  “As 
was noted in paragraph 18 above, the advertising of that multimedia player specifically stated that it 
made it possible, in particular, to watch on a television screen, freely and easily, audiovisual material 
available on the internet without the consent of the copyright holders.”  Id. 
 44. See Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶¶ 36–39 (June 
14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J (emphasis supplied):  
[T]he fact remains that those operators, by making available and managing an online sharing 
platform such as that at issue in the main proceedings, intervene, with full knowledge of the 
consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected works, by indexing on that 
platform torrent files which allow users of the platform to locate those works and to share them 
within the context of a peer-to-peer network.  In this respect, as the Advocate General stated, in 
essence, in point 50 of his Opinion, without the aforementioned operators making such a 
platform available and managing it, the works could not be shared by the users or, at the very 
least, sharing them on the internet would prove to be more complex.  
The view must therefore be taken that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB, by 
making that platform available and managing it, provide their users with access to the works 
concerned.  They can therefore be regarded as playing an essential role in making the works in 
question available.   
Finally, the operators of the online sharing platform TPB cannot be considered to be making a 
‘mere provision’ of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication, within the 
meaning of recital 27 of Directive 2001/29.  It is clear from the order for reference that that 
platform indexes torrent files in such a way that the works to which the torrent files refer may be 
easily located and downloaded by the users of that sharing platform.  Moreover, it is clear from 
the observations submitted to the Court that, in addition to a search engine, the online sharing 
platform TPB offers an index classifying the works under different categories, based on the type 
of the works, their genre or their popularity, within which the works made available are divided, 
with the platform’s operators checking to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate 
category.  In addition, those operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter 
some content. 
In the light of the foregoing, the making available and management of an online sharing 
platform, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must be considered to be an act of 
communication for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
166 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
works.”  TPB’s intervention consisted of “indexing on that platform torrent files 
which allow users of the platform to locate those works and to share them within 
the context of a peer-to-peer network.”  The index “classif[ies] the works under 
different categories, based on the type of the works, their genre or their popularity, 
within which the works made available are divided, with the platform’s operators 
checking to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate category.  In 
addition, those operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter 
some content.”  By classifying the works, TPB’s administrators must have been 
aware that protected works were at issue, as the Court later pointed out.45  Without 
that intervention, “the works could not be shared by the users or, at the very least, 
sharing them on the internet would prove to be more complex.”  Thus, to commit 
an act of communication, it suffices to facilitate an access that nonetheless could 
otherwise, albeit less easily, have been obtained. 
As for the element of knowledge tied to the “new public” criterion, the Court 
reiterated the facts that led it to reject the characterization of TPB as a mere 
furnisher of means.  In fact, TPB’s administrators had been alerted that they were 
facilitating access to infringing content.  Far from purging its index, TPB instead 
incited its users to make copies.  Given that “a very large number of torrent files on 
the online sharing platform TPB relate to works published without the consent of 
the rightholders,” TPB “could not be unaware” that its platform was providing 
access to infringing copies. 46   Curiously, although TPB was a profit-seeking 
venture, the Court, albeit generally observing that such a goal “is not irrelevant,”47 
did not apply the rebuttable presumption of knowledge announced in GS Media48 
and reiterated in Filmspeler49 relative to those who furnish hyperlinks for profit-
making purposes.  Nonetheless, in Ziggo, because it was so clear that TPB was 
acting in full knowledge of the illicit nature of the communications that it was 
facilitating, there was no need to resort to a presumption.  
The analyses of knowledge with respect to facilitation of the act of 
communication, and of knowledge respecting the “new public” criterion may differ 
 
 45. See id. at ¶ 45. 
 46. See id. (“In the present case, it is apparent from the observations submitted to the Court, first, 
that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB were informed that this platform, which they make 
available to users and manage, provides access to works published without authorisation of the 
rightholders and, second, that the same operators expressly display, on blogs and forums available on 
that platform, their purpose to make protected works available to the users, and encourage the latter to 
make copies of those works.  In any event, it is clear from the order for reference that the operators of the 
online sharing platform TPB could not be unaware that this platform provides access to works published 
without the consent of the rightholders, given that, as expressly highlighted by the referring court, a very 
large number of torrent files on the online sharing platform TPB relate to works published without the 
consent of the rightholders.  In those circumstances, it must be held that there is communication to a 
‘new public’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, 
paragraph 50).”) (emphasis supplied). 
 47. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 48. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶¶ 49–51 (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6. 
 49. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems [Filmspeler], at ¶ 49 (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. 
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to some extent.  On the one hand, the facts that led to characterizing TPB as 
engaging in an act of communication (rather than simply supplying devices or 
services) indicated that TPB knew with specificity which works were at issue (or at 
least implied a level of knowledge allowing it to classify those works by category).  
On the other hand, in the context of the “new public” criterion, the Court stressed 
that TPB “could not have been unaware” of the infringing nature of the Torrent 
files; this statement appears to require only a general knowledge of the infringing 
activities of the P2P network’s participants. 
The level of specificity of knowledge required to determine whether one who 
facilitates an act of communication herself commits such an act is important.  The 
higher the level of specificity, the harder it will be to prove that the intermediary, 
including a commercial actor, engages in an act of communication.  Because the 
question of “who commits” a copyright-implicating act comes at the outset of the 
analysis, there will be no inquiry into the level of knowledge required for the 
assessment of whether the communication was made to a “new public” if the court 
finds the defendant not to have committed an act of communication in the first 
place.  For example, it may be easier to prove that the facilitator of an infringing act 
generally knew that the site toward which it was directing Internet users contained 
infringing content, than to show that the facilitator knew precisely what works 
users would find on the site.  Moreover, a requirement of specific knowledge of 
particular infringements invites avoidance of liability through automation, so that 
only the “bot” and not the person who designed the bot would “know” to which 
works the facilitator enables access.  The Court’s statements in Ziggo regarding the 
level of knowledge are inconsistent, as we have seen.  Filmspeler, however, 
supports the interpretation that a general knowledge of infringement will suffice, 
because the facts evoked by the Court concern the illicit character of the sites 
toward which the links directed the device’s users, without stating that the supplier 
of the device knew specifically which films the linked-to sites offered.50 
Ziggo did not concern hyperlinking but rather the furnishing of other means to 
access infringing copies of works.  One may therefore conclude that the Court has 
generalized the analysis of who commits an act of communication beyond the 
context of hyperlinks in order to establish harmonized norms of liability for 
facilitation of infringement that result in the direct liability of the facilitator for 
violation of the right of communication to the public.  In other words, the Court has 
practically harmonized the “very divergent solutions” to the doctrine of derivative 
liability adopted by different E.U. member states, now ensuring that the standard 
applicable to a claim of facilitation of infringement of the right of communication 
to the public will be the same across all E.U. member states.51  Indeed, in the 
 
 50. See id. at ¶ 16 (“On that player, Mr Wullems installed an open source software, which makes 
it possible to play files through a user-friendly interface via structured menus, and integrated into it, 
without alteration, add-ons available on the internet, created by third parties, some of which specifically 
link to websites on which protected works are made available to internet users without the consent of the 
copyright holders.”). 
 51. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 3, 
https://perma.cc/6WRF-JGG4. 
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context of the facilitator of a violation of the right of communication to the public 
committed by the initial infringer, a requirement of knowledge can clarify the “role 
of the user” and thus allow the judge to determine when a facilitator should itself be 
held liable for its own act of communication to the public.  It is the facilitator’s 
“deliberate intervention”52 for the purpose of making the infringing work more 
accessible to the public that renders the intermediary liable for an illicit 
communication.  By contrast, when the facilitator has not taken an action “aimed 
directly at enabling purchasers to access copyright-protected works on the internet 
without the consent of right holders,”53 it has not played a “decisive role” in the 
illicit communication.  Hence the affirmation in Advocate General Szpunar’s 
conclusions in Ziggo that “the decisive role in the communication to the public of a 
given work cannot be attributed to [the defendant] if it is unaware that the work has 
been made available illegally.”54  “Deliberate intervention” and “decisive role” 
imply an element of knowledge when liability for an act of communication to the 
public is based on a re-communication rather than on an initial illicit 
communication.55 
One might object that this analysis appears to conflate a deliberate act with an 
intention to promote copyright infringement.  An intermediary might knowingly 
decide to facilitate access to a work, or to a site containing works, without 
necessarily knowing that the access is illicit.  Nonetheless, in the case of access 
training on a particular work, one can assume that if the work is a well-known film 
or recorded musical composition, the facilitator will be able to recognize the title 
and realize that it identifies a protected work whose availability on the target site 
was not authorized. 56   The same analysis pertains to a site containing many 
protected works.  By contrast, it would be more difficult to infer bad intent when 
the work or the targeted site do not enjoy the same celebrity as the works at issue in 
Filmspeler and Ziggo. 
In light of this case law, it is appropriate to synthesize the harmonized criteria 
that undergird a violation of the right of communication to the public.  We will 
distinguish criteria applicable to any communication, initial as well as by 
retransmission or facilitation, from criteria applicable to retransmissions or 
facilitations of access to an initial communication. 
1. Criteria Applicable to All Communications to the Public by Making 
 
 52. GS Media, Case C-160/15, at ¶ 50; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26. 
 53. See Opinion of Advocate General Sánchez Bordona, in Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 50, 
https://perma.cc/V2ZT-U4NA. 
 54. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, in Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 51, 
https://perma.cc/6WRF-JGG4. 
 55. The Court should in fact have been inquiring into whether three was a new communication 
(when it is made by one who did not make the initial communication), rather than whether there is a new 
public.  See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11bis; ALAI New Public Opinion, supra note 15. 
 56. Cf. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that sharing platform should have been aware that there 
were no authorized MP3 files either of recordings from major labels issued before 2007, or of any songs 
by the Beatles). 
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Available 
There must be an act of communication, including by making available (offering 
access to works):  “it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a 
public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective 
of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity.”57 
That act of communication must be made to the public:  “the concept of the 
‘public’ refers to an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies, 
moreover, a fairly large number of people.”58 
The commercial nature of the communication may be taken into account:  “the 
profit-making nature of a communication, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2001/29, is not irrelevant.”59  Indeed, one may assume that one who seeks 
economic benefit from an act of communication will not limit the intended 
recipients to a sole circle of family and social acquaintance. 
2. Criteria Specific to the Intermediaries Who Facilitate Unauthorized Access 
to Works by Hyperlinking or Other Means  
The “essential,” “decisive,” or “deliberate” role of the intermediary,60 “in full 
knowledge of the consequences of his action”—that is, knowing that it is 
facilitating infringement 61 —is what distinguishes the commission of an act of 
communication from the simple supplying of means.  This role may be performed 
by one whose intervention makes works more easily accessible, even when 
members of the public might have obtained access by other means.62 
3. Is the “New Public” Still a Relevant Criterion? 
When an intermediary, through the same means of communication (e.g., the 
Internet), facilitates access to a work from a legal source to which the public has 
unrestricted access, application of the “new public” criterion will preclude the 
characterization of the intervention as an act of communication.63 
By contrast, this criterion does not apply if the intermediary employs a different 
technical means of communication, 64  even if the initial source of the 
communication is lawful.65 
 
 57. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 E.C.R. 1, at ¶ 19 (Feb. 13, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE. 
 58. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems [Filmspeler], at ¶ 32 (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 34; Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 29 
(June 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J. 
 60. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 49; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 26. 
 61. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶¶ 26, 34. 
 62. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 41; Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 36. 
 63. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, 2014 E.C.R. 1, at ¶¶ 24–28 (Feb. 13, 
2014) https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE.. 
 64. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 37 (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6. 
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The application of the “new public” criterion in Svensson assumes that the 
source to which access is facilitated is legal 66  or that the intermediary is not 
circumventing an access restriction applied by the source website.67 
The illegality of the source does not, however, necessarily result in rejecting the 
“new public” criterion, but instead adds to that criterion a further consideration:  the 
intermediary’s knowledge of the illegality of the source.68   This knowledge is 
presumed when the intermediary acts with a profit motive.69 
But in order for the person who facilitates access to a communication initially 
emanating from an illegal source to be considered to have committed an act of 
communication (rather than a simple furnishing of means) in his own right, he must 
have acted “in full knowledge of the consequences of his action.”70  But knowledge 
of the illicit activity that characterizes the “new public” under GS Media will 
already have been taken into account at the first stage of the analysis, according to 
Filmspeler and Ziggo.  Hence the doubts about the pertinence of the “new public” 
criterion in the case of intermediaries who furnish unauthorized access to works.71 
B. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
If the “new public” criterion is receding into redundancy or irrelevance, the 
tension between E.U. case law and the international norms of the Berne Convention 
and WIPO Copyright Treaties should diminish as well.  The treaties supply no 
basis for the criterion; the closest text is Berne art. 11bis(2)(ii), which addresses 
secondary transmissions of broadcasts “made by an organization other than the 
original one.”72  In other words, the “new” entity is not the receiving public, but the 
person engaging in the subsequent transmission.  Once it is clear that the treaty 
 
 65. Case C-607/11, ITV Broadcasting v. TVCatchUp, 2013 E.C.R. 1, at ¶ 39 (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/AL2Q-NXCQ. 
 66. GS Media, Case C-160/15, at ¶ 43. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 50. 
 68. Id. at ¶¶ 44–49. 
 69. Id. at ¶ 51.  See also Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems [hereinafter, 
Filmspeler], at ¶¶ 49, 51.  Recently, German courts have declined to extend this rebuttable presumption 
to search engines, even though they presumably provide links with a profit motive.  See, e.g., 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 21, 2017, I ZR 11/16; LG Hamburg 
[Regional Court of Hamburg] June 13, 2017, 310 O 117/17.  This approach, which creates considerable 
tension with the authoritative language in GS Media, will be welcomed by some commentators who 
have argued that the presumption of knowledge should be “cautiously adapted for different key internet 
actors, such as search engines (which as a service aggregating massive amounts of content in an 
automated way would only have to show minimal general precautions to rebut the assumption), different 
aggregators (which would also only have to show minimal reasonable precautions to rebut the 
assumption), or persons posting individual links (which might be subject to more intensive duties of care 
. . . ).”  See Leistner, supra note 27, at 331. 
 70. Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at ¶ 31. 
 71. Some commentators offer an even harsher judgment of the “new public” criterion after GS 
Media.  See, e.g., Pekka Savola, EU Copyright Liability for Internet Linking, J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
INFORMATION TECH. & E-COMMERCE L, 2017 at para 18 (calling the criterion an “unnecessary doctrinal 
misstep”); see also supra note 27. 
 72. Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11bis(1)(ii). 
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contemplates not a different public, but a different provider of the communication, 
it should be apparent that providers of hyperlinks that render works (or more 
precisely under article 11bis(2), broadcasts of works) accessible to members of the 
public come within the scope of the right of communication to the public. 
The CJEU’s other innovations in defining a communication to the public by 
“making available” warrant comparison with our analysis of hyperlinking under 
WCT article 8.  We have suggested that the supplier of a hyperlink may be making 
a work available for individualized access if the link communicates the work 
directly to the user, rather than taking the user to another site from which the user 
may navigate her way to the work.73  In other words, deep links and framing links 
will make works available, while simple links will not (simple links make available 
the site from which the work is offered).  Deep and framing links come within the 
making available right because the sites on which these links are found are the sites 
from which the user chooses to access the work; because the user will not 
experience the access as emanating from a third-party site, she cannot have chosen 
to request a communication of the work from an unknown location.  The CJEU has 
declined to distinguish simple links from deep and framing links, 74  but its 
requirement that the linker play an “essential,” “decisive,” or “deliberate” role in 
making the work available, “in full knowledge of the consequences of his action” 
may in practice extend only to those linkers whose intervention delivers the work 
directly to the user.  Our proposed WCT analysis has focused on the choice of the 
user, while the CJEU approach examines the conduct of the linker, but the two 
inquiries can be reconciled:  the linker’s “deliberate intervention” to enhance 
individual access to the works makes it possible for the user to choose to access the 
work from the linker’s site.  Without a given linker’s offer of access to the work, a 
user seeking to stream or download that content would choose another provider’s 
“place” from which to access the work. 
It is now appropriate to consider the relationship between the harmonized 
European law of the liability of facilitators of access to illicit works or sources, and 
the harmonized European law of the non-liability of facilitators of unauthorized 
access established by the E.U. eCommerce Directive 2000/31.75 
C. FILMSPELER AND ZIGGO:  THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN OF ART. 14 OF THE 
ECOMMERCE DIRECTIVE?  
While the European law of liability for facilitation of infringement by enabling 
access to third-party infringing communications was not harmonized before 
 
 73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/B2QN-99AF. 
 75. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter, Directive 2000/31].  For a different view of the 
relationship between the CJEU’s recent caselaw and the eCommerce Directive, see Eleonora Rosati, The 
CJEU Pirate Bay Judgment and Its Impact on the Liability of Online Platforms, EIPR (forthcoming 
2017) (on file with https://perma.cc/5E3M-EKWE). 
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Filmspeler and Ziggo, the same is not true of the criteria for non-liability of certain 
intermediaries who facilitate access to third-party infringements.  Article 14 of the 
eCommerce Directive 2000/31 provides a safe harbor from liability for certain 
“information society services.”76  When the intermediary provides a service “that 
consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service . . . the 
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient 
of the service” provided that:  “(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of 
illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent. . . 
.”77  As a threshold matter, it is not immediately clear that providers of hyperlinks 
qualify in the first place for the art. 14 non-liability provision.  While some search 
engine activities (specifically, advertising services provided by search engine 
companies78) might qualify under art. 14, it does not follow that the provision of 
links by either a search engine or an individual actor corresponds to the criteria of 
art. 14.79  Providers of hyperlinks do not necessarily “stor[e] information provided 
by a recipient of the service.”  Rather, in many hyperlinking contexts, the 
hyperlinks at issue will have been provided by the operator of the website (for 
example, search engines will themselves find and index links to websites on the 
Internet, or a blogger might provide a link to another website when curating the 
content on her website). 
 
 76. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at art. 14. 
 77. Id.  These conditions of non-liability do not include an obligation “actively” to seek out 
infringing content.  On the contrary, according to art. 15, “Member States shall not impose a general 
obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the 
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity.” Id. at art. 15. 
 78. In Google France v. Louis Vuitton, the CJEU applied the art. 14 immunity provision to 
Google’s AdWords product, which allows advertisers to display their advertisements in a “sponsored 
links” section of Google’s search results when internet users search for particular keywords.  See Joined 
Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2467, 
available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT.  The CJEU ultimately held Google to be within the scope of 
non-liability provision of art. 14, but this decision rested in part on the observation that Google stored 
not only links, but “the keywords selected by the advertiser” and “the accompanying commercial 
message” that allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s trademarks.  Id. at ¶ 111.  Although Google may have 
suggested the keywords its customers selected, formally at least, the keyword links were “provided by a 
recipient of the service” and thus qualified under the language of art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive.  
Google’s search engine (in contrast to its advertising service) may in fact involve the storage of much 
less—a search engine need only store a link to an indexed webpage, and such a link may not be 
“provided by a recipient of the service,” but instead created through Google’s web crawler technology.  
Similarly, the provider of an individual link by an actor who is not a search engine may not store 
anything other than a simple URL address, which the website creator (rather than a “recipient of the 
service”) provided. 
 79. The German Federal Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that a search engine may be liable for 
copyright infringement only once it had obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of the data it had 
stored and then did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that data—mirroring the 
language of the eCommerce Directive.  See Vorschaubilder I [Google Image Search], Bundesgerichtshof 
[Federal Court of Justice], I ZR 69/08 (2010).  See also Birgit Clark, Google Image Search Does Not 
Infringe Copyright, says Bundesgerichtshof, 5 J. Iɴᴛᴇʟʟ. Pʀᴏᴘ. L. & Pʀᴀᴄ. 553 (2010) (noting that this 
decision implies that search engines could claim safe harbor under the eCommerce Directive). 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
2018] LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT 173 
E.U. member state authorities and commentators appear to agree that the safe 
harbor provisions of the eCommerce Directive do not cover information location 
tools like search engines or hyperlinks, but that E.U. member states are free to 
create additional safe harbors through national law for search engines or hyperlink 
providers.80  While the parallel safe harbor legislation in the United States (the 
DMCA, which was passed two years before the passage of the eCommerce 
directive81) does provide a specific safe harbor for “information location tools,” the 
eCommerce Directive neglects to provide such a safe harbor.82  The eCommerce 
Directive does, however, require the submission of a report to “analyse the need for 
proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool 
services.”83 
Once past the question whether the eCommerce Directive applies at all to 
linking activities, one will recognize a certain parallelism between the conditions 
for a violation of the right of communication to the public by facilitation, and those 
of the non-liability of service providers covered by the eCommerce Directive.  In 
both cases, the lack of knowledge of the illicit activity excludes liability.  But the 
Directive sets out only the conditions of non-liability; it was up to the E.U. member 
States to draw the negative inference, and to decide whether (or not) effective 
knowledge resulted in the liability of those who facilitate access to infringing 
content.  The CJEU has now filled this gap by taking on the task of assessing the 
liability of facilitators, not only for “information society services” covered by the 
Directive, but also for any Internet intermediary. 
 
 80. First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular 
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, COM (2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003), at 13 (Nov. 21, 
2003), https://perma.cc/Z6PG-AMDF [hereinafter, First Report] (“Whilst it was not considered 
necessary to cover hyperlinks and search engines in the Directive, the Commission has encouraged 
Member States to further develop legal security for internet intermediaries.”); Id. at 13 n.69 (noting that 
Spain and Portugal have “opted for the model of Article 14 [“hosting” safe harbor] both for search 
engines and hyperlinks” and that Austria and Lichtenstein have “opted for the model of Article 12 
[“mere conduit” safe harbor] for search engines and of Article 14 [“hosting” safe harbor] for 
hyperlinks”).  For example, the Austrian E-Commerce Act provides safe harbor for “[a] service provider 
which provides users with a search engine or other electronic aids to search for third-party information” 
and “[a] service provider which provides access to third-party information by means of an electronic 
link.”  See Federal Act Governing Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commercial and Legal 
Transactions (E-Commerce Act – ECG), Jan. 1 2002, https://perma.cc/2LXQ-SB9P.  See also First 
Report, for an overview of the additional safe harbor regimes applicable to search engines or linkers 
implemented in Austria, Hungary, Spain, and Portugal.  French courts appear to have achieved a similar 
result.  See SAIF v. Google, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Jan. 26, 2011, 
08/13423, https://perma.cc/U9SW-55PA (holding Google Image Search to be a mere neutral provider of 
tools—links—employed by users, and holding that the mere fact that Google was “aware that [its] 
automatic indexing is likely to infringe on copyrighted works is not sufficient to engage its liability 
insofar as the services are ready to de-index upon notification”). 
 81. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) 
(1998). 
 82. See First Report, supra note 80, at 13 (noting that coverage of hyperlinks and search engines 
“was not considered necessary” when drafting the eCommerce Directive). 
 83. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at art. 21(2). 
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By putting the facilitator’s knowledge up front in the analysis, the Court has 
procedurally anticipated the criteria of the eCommerce Directive, but has also 
extended them to intermediaries who do not qualify to invoke the Directive.  For 
example, Filmspeler would not be an “information society service” because it was 
selling physical devices (set top boxes).  And even if it could have been considered 
a service provider, the links it loaded onto the media player were not “information 
stored at the request of a recipient of the service,” that is, by Filmspeler’s 
customers, but were furnished by the service itself.  Nonetheless, its liability will 
depend on the assessment of its level of knowledge, just as its non-liability would 
have depended on the same assessment if it had qualified for the immunity 
established by the eCommerce Directive.  Similarly, the liability of a hyperlink 
provider, who does not “stor[e]” “information . . . at the request of a recipient of 
[its] service” and thus may be ineligible for the art. 14 safe harbor, may depend on 
the same assessment of the provider’s level of knowledge. 
There is one difference in the analyses regarding the placement of the burden of 
proof.  Because art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive limits the service provider’s 
liability, the beneficiary of the limitation should bear the burden of proving 
compliance with its conditions.  By contrast, when the question of knowledge 
becomes part of the case in chief, the right holder bears the burden of establishing 
every element of the claim, including that the defendant acted with knowledge that 
it was facilitating infringement.  That said, the rebuttable presumption that the 
Court imposed on commercial actors in the context of the “new public” analysis in 
GS Media could also apply to the analysis of the deliberate intervention of the 
intermediary in the commission of an act of communication.  In that case, profit-
seeking defendants will be required to prove their lack of knowledge.  As a result, 
commercial actors will receive the same treatment under the analysis of liability for 
facilitation of infringing communications as under the analysis of non-liability of 
“information society services” covered by the eCommerce Directive. 
Given the debate in the E.U. over whether art. 14 of the eCommerce Directive 
has resulted in a “value gap” that allows service providers, such as YouTube, to 
benefit from the commercial value of works of authorship without paying the right 
holders, one might inquire whether the effective transposition of the non-liability 
criteria from art. 14 to the analysis of the reach of the right of communication to the 
public under art. 3 of the InfoSoc Directive will further weaken that right.84  But 
basing the liability of facilitators of infringement on the concept of knowledge 
derived from art. 14 could in fact increase the predictability of the analysis of that 
liability.  Indeed, looking at the facts in Filmspeler and Ziggo in the light of art. 14 
and the CJEU’s case law interpreting the eCommerce directive, notably in Google 
France v. Vuitton, C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2008), and L’Oréal v. eBay, C-324/09 
 
 84. See, e.g., 2016 Proposal, supra note 31; ALAI, Resolution on the European proposals of 14 
September 2016 to introduce fairer sharing of the value when works and other protected material are 
made available by electronic means (Feb. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/LBY5-4638. 
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(2011), the same results would obtain, but with additional elements available to 
evaluate the defendants’ knowledge.85 
Google France and L’Oréal were trademark infringement cases involving in the 
first case the AdWords service, and in the second an online auction platform.  
Because the eCommerce Directive is transversal, the CJEU’s case law on (non) 
liability for trademark infringement illuminates (non) liability for copyright 
infringement as well.  In both cases, the courts assessed whether the service played 
“an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data 
stored.”86  The notion of “an active role” resembles the “deliberate intervention” 
that characterizes the commission of an act of communication by facilitation.  By 
contrast, if “the role played by that service is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is 
merely technical, automatic and passive,” that neutrality indicates “a lack of 
knowledge or control of the data which it stores.” 87   In applying these 
considerations to Ziggo and Filmspeler, it becomes clear that the contributions of 
these actors were far from “neutral.”  For example, the Court pointed out that the 
administrators of The Pirate Bay “expressly display, on blogs and forums available 
on that platform, their purpose to make protected works available to the users, and 
encourage the latter to make copies of those works.”88 
The neutrality required by the eCommerce Directive art. 14 case law resembles 
the notion of “making a mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making 
a communication” that characterizes an act that will not be considered an act of 
communication under the case law on liability for facilitation of infringement of the 
right of communication to the public.  Thus, in Filmspeler, the Court detailed the 
acts of the defendant that constituted “communications.”  The device allowed “a 
direct link to be established between websites broadcasting counterfeit works and 
purchasers of the multimedia player, without which the purchasers would find it 
difficult to benefit from those protected works, [this] is quite different from the 
mere provision of physical facilities.”89  In other words, Filmspeler “optimized” 
access to infringing content; that optimization, like the promotion of unlawful 
 
 85. See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 2010 
E.C.R. I-2417, I-2467, available at https://perma.cc/6YR9-V2MT; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay 
International, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, I-6073, available at https://perma.cc/TNV2-A5AW. 
 86. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at ¶ 120; L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. at ¶ 113. 
 87. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at ¶ 114. 
 88. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, at ¶ 45 (June 14, 
2017), https://perma.cc/LC4A-BU5J.  The administrators had also “indexe[d] torrent files in such a way 
that the works to which the torrent files refer may be easily located and downloaded by the users of that 
sharing platform” with the goal of aiding users to find the files.  Id. at ¶ 38.  Compare L’Oréal, 2011 
E.C.R. at ¶ 116 (“Where, by contrast, the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, 
optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be 
considered not to have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential 
buyers but to have played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the 
data relating to those offers for sale.  It cannot then rely, in the case of those data, on the exemption from 
liability referred to in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31.”).  
 89. Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems [hereinafter, Filmspeler], at ¶ 41 
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. 
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access, is an act whose lack of neutrality the Court emphasized in its eCommerce 
Directive case law.90 
One should also recall that, according to art. 14, the knowledge that precludes 
immunity from liability is not only specific knowledge of the unlawful activity but 
also “knowledge of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity or 
information is apparent.”  The latter type of knowledge appears to correspond to the 
knowledge attributed to the administrators of The Pirate Bay:  given that “a very 
large number of torrent files on the online sharing platform TPB relate to works 
published without the consent of the rightholders,” they “could not be unaware”91 
that the files were infringing.   
One might object that the symmetry between liability for facilitation of illicit 
communications and the Court’s interpretation of the art. 14 eCommerce Directive 
criteria is imperfect because the former presumes the knowledge of commercial 
actors, while no similar presumptions accompany art. 14.  Once might buttress the 
objection with the observation that one of the objectives of the eCommerce 
Directive was to protect “information society services” from liability for their 
users’ unlawful acts, even though many of those services operate for profit.92  But 
the critique is ill-founded.  It overlooks the role of a rebuttable presumption of 
knowledge, which reverses the burden of proof and requires the commercial 
defendant to prove that it acted without knowledge of ensuing infringements.  
Moreover, because art. 14 derogates from the liability the services could otherwise 
incur, the services should bear the burden of conforming their conduct to the 
prerequisites for qualifying for the liability limitation.  To the extent there is a 
disparity in treatment between the showing of an infringement case-in-chief, and 
the showing required to claim the immunity from liability, it favors non-
commercial actors, for to establish their liability for infringement of the right of 
communication to the public, the right holder will need to prove their knowledge of 
the illicit character of the source to which they facilitate access.  By contrast, had 
art. 14 applied, the service, whether or not for-profit, would have to prove its lack 
of knowledge.  Because art. 14 limits providers’ liability, its analysis comes after 
the prima facie case.93  If at the outset the absence of a presumption of knowledge 
would lead a court to decline to rule that a non-commercial defendant violated the 
right of communication to the public, then the court will never get to the question 
 
 90. See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. at ¶ 116. 
 91. See Ziggo, Case C-610/15, at ¶ 45. 
 92. See, e.g., Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at recital 2. 
 93. Although art. 14 eCommerce Directive states that “the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service,” the service provider remains subject to 
injunctive relief under art. 8.3 Directive 2001/29, which provides that right holders may obtain an 
“injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or 
related right.”  Compare Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at art. 14, with Directive 2001/29, supra note 
22, at art. 8. 
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of whether the defendant satisfied the criteria for application of the eCommerce 
Directive’s criteria.94 
III. U.S. LAW ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING 
A. DIRECT LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Statutory Basis for Copyright Coverage of Hyperlinks 
The author’s exclusive rights under the U.S. Copyright Act expressly include 
neither a “making available” right, nor a right of “communication to the public.”  
The closest statutory analog to those rights in the context of hyperlinking is the 
right to display or perform a work publicly by transmission or other means of 
communication under § 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act.95  Section 101 of that act 
defines “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’” as:  
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.96   
The definition section also specifies that “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance or display 
is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent.”97  The statutory language is 
technologically neutral, on its face encompassing all means of direct and secondary 
communications of performances or displays of works.  U.S. case law on 
hyperlinking, however, has introduced a limiting gloss. 
2. The Server Rule and Perfect 10 v. Amazon 
In the U.S., a judge-made doctrine known as the “server test” or “server rule” 
governs the treatment of hyperlinks under the Copyright Act
. 98   The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the test in a 2007 case, Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 
and  many                         U.S. courts since then have followed it.99  Under the 
 
 94. We will consider the compatibility with international norms of the eCommerce Directive’s 
liability limitations for service providers after we address the parallel regime in the U.S. under section 
512 of the Copyright Act.  See infra Part III.C. 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 96. Id. at § 101.  Section 101 also defines the term “to transmit” as “to communicate it by any 
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”  
Id. 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 98. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 99. See id.; see also MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 1615(CM), 2012 WL 
1107648, at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that “merely providing a ‘link’ to a site 
containing copyrighted material does not constitute direct infringement of the holder’s distribution 
right”). Four available cases directly conflict with the “server test.”  See Justin Goldman v. Breitbart 
News Network, LLC, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 21--24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (expressly 
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“server rule,” “the owner of a computer that does not store and serve . . . electronic 
information to a user is not displaying [or distributing] that information, even if 
such owner in-line links to or frames the electronic information.”100  Therefore, a 
defendant who provides a hyperlink of any kind (through simple linking, deep 
linking, framing, or in-line linking101) cannot incur direct copyright liability unless 
that defendant also “store[s] and serve[s]” the copyrighted material to which the 
link points. 
In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, a copyright holder sued Google for copyright 
infringement, alleging that Google infringed its copyrighted images by (1) storing 
“thumbnail” copies of those images on Google servers, which were then presented 
to Google Image Search users in a list of search results, and (2) presenting Google 
Image Search users with full-size versions of the images when those users clicked 
on a thumbnail image presented in the search results.102  Google conceded that it 
had created and displayed the “thumbnail” copies of the images in question, and 
argued (successfully) that the creation of thumbnail images to enable users to easily 
search for images constituted fair use.103  However, as the lower court noted, there 
was a fundamental distinction between the presentation of Google’s “thumbnail” 
image copies (which were actually stored on Google servers) and the presentation 
of the full-sized images, which were not stored on Google servers but were instead 
served up to users through “framed” or “in-line” links which directed the users’ 
browsers to the server on which the images originally appeared, albeit while in-
lining the destination site with information from the linking site.104 
The lower court had adopted an interpretation of the Copyright Act under which 
Google would be found directly liable only for displaying and distributing the 
images it stored on its own servers, based on the “server test” whose adoption 
 
declining to follow Perfect 10 and arguing that the “server test” is not “adequately grounded in the text 
of the Copyright Act”);  The Leader’s Institute, LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 
WL 5629514, *10 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (expressly declining to follow Perfect 10 and instead holding that 
“by framing the defendants’ copyrighted works, the plaintiffs impermissibly displayed the works to the 
public”); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3876910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011), 
vacated, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To the extent that Perfect 10 can be read to stand for the 
proposition that inline linking can never cause a display of images or videos that would give rise to a 
claim of direct copyright infringement, we respectfully disagree.”); Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. 
Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 79311, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding that a defendant 
may have infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by framing media available on the plaintiff’s website) (note 
that Live Nation Motor Sports was decided a six months before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 
10 v. Amazon). 
 100. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843–45 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 101. For clarity, this Article employs the term “in-line linking” to refer to both in-line linking and 
framing.  See supra note 1.  
 102. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1155–56. 
 103. Id. at 1165 (noting that while “an image may have been created originally to serve an 
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image into a pointer 
directing a user to a source of information” and thus “provides an entirely new use for the original work” 
which constitutes permissible fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 104. Id. at 1161 (noting that when displaying the full-sized images, Google simply “provides 
HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size 
photographic image”). 
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Google urged.105  On appeal, Perfect 10 countered by pointing out that “[f]rom a 
user’s perspective, viewing material within a ‘frame’ while on google.com is no 
different from viewing material stored on Google’s own server.”106  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected Perfect 10’s position and endorsed the lower court’s logic.  The 
Ninth Circuit contended that a link is, essentially “HTML instructions [constituting 
mere] lines of text,” and that “[p]roviding these HTML instructions is not 
equivalent to showing a copy.” 107   According to the court, “it is the [source] 
website publisher’s computer that distributes [and displays] copies of the images by 
transmitting the photographic image electronically to the user’s computer,” and 
Google’s HTML instructions “do not themselves cause infringing images to appear 
on the user’s computer screen.”108 
Perfect 10 essentially precluded the argument that, under U.S. law, the provision 
of a link could constitute an act of direct infringement, even if a website’s act of 
linking is done in a way that might “cause some computer users to believe they are 
viewing a single . . . webpage” rather than a link to a source website.109  Since 
2007, U.S. courts have held that the “server test” bars any finding of direct 
copyright liability for simple linking,110 deep linking111 or in-line linking.112  U.S. 
 
 105. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 843–45.  The lower court’s adoption of the “server 
test” was based partially on an analysis of relevant precedent which implied that direct infringement in 
the internet context required that the defendant “use its hardware to either store the infringing images or 
move them from one location to another for display.”  See id. at 840–43 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).  The lower court also relied 
on other cases holding that hyperlinking does not necessarily constitute direct infringement of the 
reproduction or distribution rights.  See id. at 842 (citing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 
CV 99-7643, 2000 WL 525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), which held that “hyperlinking does not 
itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act . . . since no copying is involved,” and Arista Records, 
Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660, 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002), which 
held that linking to content does not implicate the distribution right). 
 106. Third Brief on Cross-Appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Perfect 10, Inc., Perfect 
10 v. Google, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-55406), 2006 WL 3023532, at section I.C. 
 107. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161. 
 108. Id. at 1161–62. 
 109. Id.  See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 49 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/2DPW-HWVF (“The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Perfect 10 has been relied on to bar direct infringement claims for instances of inline linking and 
framing.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 963 F. Supp. 2d 239, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding that a defendant who provided a link to its customers to a file sharing site which allowed for the 
download of an infringing copy of plaintiff’s work did not commit an act of direct infringement, noting 
that “sending an email containing a hyperlink to a site facilitating the sale of a copyrighted work does 
not itself constitute copyright infringement”). 
 111. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99–7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 
525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 27, 2000) (noting that the defendant’s deep linking to event pages on the 
Ticketmaster website did not constitute infringement because “hyperlinking does not itself involve a 
violation of the Copyright Act . . . since no copying is involved” and because “[t]he customer is 
automatically transferred to the particular genuine web page of the original author. . . [t]his is analogous 
to using a library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently”). 
 112. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1159; MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., No. 10 
Civ. 1615(CM), 2012 WL 1107648, at *12–14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that an online 
platform which provided toolbars which incorporated in-line links to plaintiff’s copyrighted games did 
not commit an act of direct infringement when it in-line linked to plaintiff’s games without permission, 
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courts instead characterize the provision of hyperlinks of any form as the 
facilitation of a user’s access to infringing works, which “raises only [secondary] 
liability issues.”113 
3. Analysis of the Server Rule 
a. The Server Rule, Statutory Authority and Misplaced Metaphors 
The natural implication of the “server rule” is that the mere provision of a 
hyperlink of any kind cannot constitute an act of public performance or display and 
therefore cannot constitute a direct violation of the exclusive rights reserved to 
copyright holders under § 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act.114  Thus, despite the 
breadth and technological neutrality of those rights, the server rule effectively 
assumes that a hyperlink is not a “device or process” that “transmit[s] or otherwise 
communicate[s] a performance or display of a work . . . to the public.”115  This 
logic relies on a restrictive definition of “transmit or otherwise communicate,” 
which it reads to include only those “device[s] or process[es]” which “cause 
infringing images to appear on the user’s screen,” by pushing data from the server 
on which the work is stored to the user’s browser.116  The statutory definition of “to 
transmit,” however, is not so constrained.  The statutory language includes within 
the definition of “transmit” “any . . . process . . . whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent.”117  The legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended to broaden the definition of public performances 
and displays to cover “not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further 
act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the 
public.”118  The “process . . . whereby images . . . are received” on a user’s screen 
certainly includes the hyperlinks and HTML code which cause that image to 
appear.  Even under a strictly technical approach, the process through which a 
user’s browser displays a webpage begins not when the host server sends data to 
the user’s browser, but when the clicked hyperlink instructs the user’s browser to 
retrieve the data from the source server and provides the browser with the relevant 
URL address.  As the Ninth Circuit explained:  the hyperlink “gives the address of 
the image to the user’s browser.  The browser then interacts with the [server, 
which] causes an . . . image to appear on the user’s computer screen.”119  The 
fundamental assumption underlying the server rule is that the first part of this 
process, which enables the browser to connect with the right server, is not part of 
the “process” at all.  By contrast, in a recent decision, the District Court for the 
 
noting that “merely providing a ‘link’ to a site containing copyrighted material does not constitute direct 
infringement of a holder’s distribution right”). 
 113. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161. 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 115. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 116. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161. 
 117. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis supplied). 
 118. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976). 
 119. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161. 
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Southern District of New York rejected this logic, noting that when a website 
“paste[s] a code line into its blog/article that contains” HTML instructions to 
“embed” an image from a different website into its page, that website “[takes] 
active steps to put a process in place that resulted in a transmission of the [linked-to 
work] so that they could be visibly shown.”120  These “active steps,” according to 
the court, “constitute a process” and the “plain language of the Copyright Act calls 
for no more” to establish an act of direct infringement.121 
Similarly, the inclusion of a catch-all category in the statutory definition 
(“transmit or otherwise communicate”) indicates that the definition should be read 
broadly, not narrowly.
122
 The drafters of the bill intended the scope of the display 
right to be broad enough to include “[e]ach and every method by which the images 
. . . comprising a . . . display are picked up and conveyed” and “any act by which 
[an] initial performance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made to recur,” 
including “any type of electronic retrieval system.”123 
In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit provided an additional basis for its adoption of 
the server rule:  it invented a requirement that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the 
public display right must prove that the defendant had possession of a copy of the 
copyrighted work.124  In the court’s words, a defendant who “does not have a copy 
[of the work] . . . . cannot communicate a copy” through a public display.125  The 
court thus concluded that a defendant who supplies any type of link cannot publicly 
display the linked-to work, because such a defendant lacks possession of a tangible 
copy of the work.126  However, the Copyright Act strongly suggests that a person 
may commit an act of infringing public display or performance without possession 
of a copy of the work. The Copyright Act defines “display” as “to show a copy of 
it, either directly or by means of film, slide, television image, or any other device or 
process,”127 and nowhere indicates that to “show a copy” requires possession of 
that copy.  It seems evident that a person may “show a copy” even if the copy 
“belongs to someone else”128—in the words of one recent opinion, “a person that 
went into a movie theater and used a video camera connected to the internet to 
 
120.     Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 18--19 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018).  
    121.    Id. at 19. 
122.     Id. at 17-18 (noting that the definitions of “to perform or display a work ‘publicly’” and “to 
‘transmit’” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 are “plainly drafted with the intent to sweep broadly”).  
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63–64. 
 124. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160—61. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 128. See Lee Burgunder & Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10, 17 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 16 (2008) (“[T]he Copyright Act makes it unlawful merely to display a copy 
of a copyrighted work. Thus, the copy could be one that belongs to someone else; it does not have to be 
a copy that the individual, in fact, owns.  This means that if one had a device that could transmit an 
image from one place to another, this person could display someone else’s work in a separate location 
simply by pointing the device at that other individual’s copyrighted image.  Certainly, this would 
effectuate a public display under the terms of the Copyright Act, despite the fact that this person does 
not own or possess a personal copy of the work.”). 
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broadcast a movie to the public would clearly be committing copyright 
infringement even though the person did not herself have a copy of the movie.”129  
Moreover, other provisions of the Copyright Act which provide exceptions to the 
exclusive rights laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 106 clearly imply that a party may commit 
an act of public display or performance without having possession of a copy of the 
work.130  Several courts have noted this flaw in the reasoning underlying the server 
rule.131 
In devising its “possession of a copy” requirement, the Ninth Circuit overlooked 
the difference between the two separate clauses which define “to perform or display 
a work ‘publicly’” under the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 101 defines this phrase to 
mean: 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered; or  
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a 
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.132 
While a public performance or display of a work in a place open to the public 
(clause (1)) may imply at least the temporary possession of a source copy for the 
 
 129. The Leader’s Institute, LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 
5629514, *11 (N.D. Tex. 2017).  See also Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 
1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[T]his court sees nothing in the text or purpose of 
the Copyright Act suggesting that physical possession of an image is a necessary element to its display 
for purposes of the Act.”); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. 
Supp. 2d 627, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that defendants had “accessed archived screenshots of 
[plaintiff’s] website via the Wayback Machine, and the images were displayed on their computers” and 
that “the display of copyrighted images on computers in an office constitutes a public display.”).  
 130. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (providing that “communication of a transmission embodying a 
performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving 
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes” “are not infringements of copyright” unless “(i) a 
direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is further 
transmitted to the public”).  This language implies that, but for this provision, the reception of a 
broadcast transmission of a copyrighted work on a public television or radio receiver (i.e. in a restaurant 
or hotel lobby) would constitute a public display or performance, even though the operator of the 
receiver may not possess a copy of the work. See Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-
KBF at 22 (noting that the § 110(5) exemption “is strong evidence that a copy need not be made in order 
to display an image”).  
 131. See, e.g., Leader’s Institute, 2017 WL 5629514 at *10 (“[T]o the extent Perfect 10 makes 
actual possession of a copy a necessary condition to violating a copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
display her copyrighted works, the Court respectfully disagrees with the Ninth Circuit . . . The text of the 
Copyright Act does not make actual possession of a copy of a work a prerequisite for infringement. To 
display a work, someone need only show a copy of the work; a person need not actually possess a copy 
to display a work.”); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3876910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 1, 2011), vacated, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In our view, a website’s servers need not actually 
store a copy of a work in order to ‘display’ it.”). 
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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performance or display,133 reading such a prerequisite into the “transmit” clause 
(clause (2)) may unduly limit the reach of this definition, which neither requires nor 
implies that the person committing the performance or display must possess a copy 
of the work. 134   The House Report accompanying the § 101 definition of the 
“transmit” clause listed several examples of “transmissions” covered by the clause; 
many of these involve transmissions by actors who would not typically possess a 
copy of the work that is the object of the communication: 
[T]he concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial 
rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is 
transmitted or communicated to the public. Thus, for example . . . a local broadcaster 
is performing when it transmits [a] network broadcast; a cable television system is 
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is 
performing whenever he or she . . . communicates [a] performance by turning on a 
receiving set.135 
In support of the server test, U.S. courts typically downplay the role of 
hyperlinks in content delivery.  One court likened the provision of a hyperlink to 
“using a library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and 
more efficiently.” 136   Another court described hyperlinking as the “digital 
equivalent of giving the recipient driving directions to another website on the 
Internet.”137  These metaphors naturally support the conclusion that a hyperlink 
does not constitute part of the “process” of content transmission—in the view of 
most U.S. courts, hyperlinks, like “library’s card index[es]” and “driving 
directions” merely supply the information necessary for third parties to make a 
transfer, but they are not part of the transfer itself.  However, these metaphors 
overlook the range of functions that hyperlinks serve on the Internet.  
Hyperlinks do provide information about the online location of the content that 
the user seeks to access.  This locational-information function is, indeed, analogous 
to the function fulfilled by a “library’s card index” or “driving directions” in that it 
connects two end-points which seek to communicate with each other, but does not 
itself constitute part of the process that communicates a work from point A (the 
 
 133. Ironically, the Copyright Act allows the display of a copy of a work by an owner lawfully in 
possession of that copy “without the authority of the copyright owner.”  By misreading a “possession of 
a copy” requirement into the second clause of the “public display” definition, the Ninth Circuit has 
effectively flipped this rule to make possession of a digital copy a prerequisite of liability for public 
display by transmission.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy lawfully made under 
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a 
time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”) 
 134. H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 64 (1976) (“Each and every method by which the images or sounds 
comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission.’”). 
 135. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). 
 136. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99–7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, 
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
 137. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 963 F. Supp. 2d 239, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  See also 
Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1161 (“The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user’s 
browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image.”). 
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source site) to point B (the user’s device)—the provision of locational information 
simply makes the communication possible.  However, most hyperlinks are 
clickable when presented on the webpages, and therefore these hyperlinks also act 
as a trigger which, when clicked, commence the communication between two end-
points.  When a user clicks on a hyperlink on a webpage, or visits a webpage that 
utilizes an in-line link, the hyperlink (and the underlying HTML code) triggers the 
transfer of information between the server and the user’s browser.  In other words, 
the hyperlink, when clicked, sets in motion the process through which the ultimate 
communication is consummated.  This is the fundamental difference between a 
URL which is printed on a page in a book (which provides only locational 
information, and which can be utilized only if a user enters the address into her 
browser) and a URL which is embedded in a website as hypertext (which typically 
appears as blue, underlined text).  
From a purely technical perspective, then, a clickable link that appears as 
hypertext on a website consists of more than just locational information.  A 
hyperlink becomes clickable on a website only when the website’s HTML code 
includes an HTML “tag” and a portion of code which turns the URL address into a 
clickable button which will lead the user’s browser directly to the linked-to 
website.  For example, a hyperlink to www.copyright.gov will display as a 
clickable hyperlink on a webpage only when the webpage’s code contains the 
script: “<a href=“www.copyright.gov”>www.copyright.gov</a>.” 138   The code 
surrounding the URL address exists only to activate the process of communication 
between server and browser. 
Moreover, hyperlinks are often disguised as text (i.e. “click here”) or presented 
graphically as buttons on a website.139  In these contexts, the “trigger” function of 
hyperlinks is particularly prominent—the hyperlink still provides locational 
information to the user’s browser, but the hyperlink is presented to the user as a 
way to start a process through which another website’s home page (simple link), or 
a specific piece of content (deep link, in-line link) will be delivered to the user’s 
browser. 
Instead of the only partially accurate “library card” and “driving directions” 
metaphors, we propose a more precise analogy:  telephone directory assistance 
services.  These services (typically reached by dialing the numbers “411” on a 
telephone) first connect a caller to a directory assistance operator, who helps the 
user identify the phone number of the intended recipient—thus providing the 
information necessary to connect two end-points (caller and recipient) and fulfilling 
a function analogous to the function served by “driving directions” or a “library’s 
card index.”  However, most directory assistance services do more:  if the caller 
requests, the directory assistance operator may re-direct the caller’s phone line to 
the intended recipient’s line, thereby setting in motion the technical process 
 
 138. HTML Links, W3SCHOOLS.COM, https://perma.cc/UV2F-FBLE (last visited Oct. 11, 2017). 
 139. Connecting to Other Websites, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES: COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE, 
https://perma.cc/8HAJ-WE9K (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (“[A] website will connect to another in the 
form of a link (also known as a ‘hypertext’ link), a specially coded word or image that when clicked 
upon, will take a user to another Web page.”) (emphasis supplied). 
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through which the two end-points in fact connect.  Similarly, a hyperlink both 
provides locational information to a user’s browser, and (when clicked) sets in 
motion the process through which the user’s browser requests the source server to 
deliver the desired content. 
The role that directory assistance plays in the ultimate transmission of 
information between two end-points is optional; the caller could simply bypass 
directory assistance if the caller knows the right number to call, just as the Internet 
user can bypass the use of a hyperlink if the user knows the URL address of the 
website she intends to visit.  But if a user does use directory assistance not only to 
identify the number but also to place the call, it seems evident that the call-
placement role played by the directory assistance operators is part of the “process” 
through which a telephone user reaches a recipient.  Similarly, a clickable hyperlink 
must be considered part of the “process” through which a user accesses a piece of 
underlying content:  after a user clicks a link, the HTML code embedded in the link 
begins the process of transmission by supplying the URL location of the content to 
the user’s browser and instructing the browser to access that URL, after which the 
browser completes the process of retrieving the content from the source server.  
Moreover, some hyperlinks provide a further function by presenting the 
underlying material in a specific manner or context, or by cutting out intermediary 
steps that would otherwise be necessary for the user to access the content.  While it 
may be true that a “simple” link (i.e. a URL to the U.S. Copyright Office’s home 
page) fulfills a function limited to sending the user to another site that will in turn 
provide information about the location of a particular piece of content, deep links 
and in-line links do more than provide locational information—they instead serve 
up content directly to the user.140  In-line links may be used to “frame” the content 
in a particular way on a website—thus in-line links can deliver content directly to a 
user without the need to navigate to a new webpage, or can place content in a 
specific context alongside other content, or draw attention to a particular portion of 
the content (e.g., a particular page in an in-line linked PDF document).  Similarly, 
deep links deliver the content to the user directly, stripping away the need to 
navigate through the source website to access that work.  In other words, in-line 
and deep links not only fulfill the function of a “library’s card index” by identifying 
the location of a piece of content—these links take the metaphorical book off the 
library’s shelf, place the book in the recipient’s hands, and turn to a particular page. 
Thus, the server rule rests on an under-inclusive reading of the term “process” 
under which the “process” begins at the physical origin of the content, and ends 
with the delivery of that content to the browser (thus excluding from the term 
“process” any preliminary steps which provide the user’s browser with the location 
of the desired content, or set the process in motion by providing a button or a piece 
 
 140. ALAI, Report and Opinion on: a Berne-compatible reconciliation of hyperlinking and the 
communication to the public right on the internet (June 17 2015), https://perma.cc/B9FG-CDJP (“[In-
line and deep] links offer the works to the public in such a way that the members of the public may 
access the works at a place and time chosen by them.  Those who furnish these kinds of links make it 
possible to bring the works directly to the computer or device screens of the user, or to download them 
directly to the computer or device, without further intermediation.”) 
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of code which begins the process of transmission).  From a technological 
perspective, then, the “server rule,” mischaracterizes the “process” contemplated by 
section 101.  More importantly, setting aside the technological minutiae of the 
process through which clickable deep or in-line links cause a work’s images or 
sounds to be received by the end user, it “makes no difference” to the user’s 
experience of the work whether its delivery emanated directly from the source site, 
or arrived through the mediation of a link.141  As the copyright holder noted in its 
arguments before the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. Amazon, the court’s interpretive 
approach draws a legal line which completely ignores the user experience:  the 
typical viewer of a website has no way of distinguishing content which is stored on 
the servers of the website operator (and which is thus being “displayed” under the 
logic of the server rule) and content which is pulled from a third-party server 
through an in-line link (which, according to the server rule, is not being displayed 
by the website operator).  This user-agnostic approach is in tension with Supreme 
Court case law which instructs courts to “focus on the [work] as presented to, and 
perceptible by” the public142 when interpreting the Copyright Act.143 
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court cast doubt on analyses that privilege technical characterization over user 
experience.144  In Aereo, the Supreme Court held that a service which provided 
online access to broadcast television committed acts of “public performance” even 
though it used user-specific television antennae to send user-specific re-
transmissions of televised content to each user.  A significant part of the majority’s 
analysis focused on comparing Aereo’s product to traditional television cable 
delivery services (which do commit acts of “public performance”).  The Court 
strongly de-emphasized the technical differences between the two services, and 
instead focused on the user experience: 
In terms of the Act’s purposes, [the differences between Aereo’s product and 
traditional cable services] do not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, 
which do perform “publicly.”  Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, 
why should any of these technological differences matter?  They concern the behind-
the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ 
screens.  They do not render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of 
cable companies.  Nor do they significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s 
subscribers.  Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care 
much whether images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a large multi 
subscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they arrive 
 
 141. In a recent case, the Supreme Court made a similar observation, noting that “technological 
differences” that do not “significantly alter the [user’s] experience” should not govern the interpretation 
of the public display and performance rights under §106.  American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498, 2508 (2014). 
 142. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499 (2001). 
 143. See, e.g., Brief of Getty Images (US) Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, 
Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 3144 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017), at 5 
(noting the tension between Perfect 10 and Tasini). 
 144. Id. at 2506.  
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
2018] LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT 187 
instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they are transmitted directly 
or after a personal copy is made?145 
Therefore, the Aereo Court’s logic dismisses the kind of “technological 
differences” that underlie the server rule. The technical differences between 
Aereo’s system of delivering content and the system used by traditional cable 
companies had no bearing on whether Aereo’s actions fell within the statutory 
definition of “public performance.”  One might wonder why the technical 
differences between the delivery of a piece of content stored on a website’s server, 
and the delivery of a piece of content in-line linked to that website should matter at 
all to the analysis of whether that website commits an act of “public performance or 
display” when most users of that website are completely unable to distinguish 
between the two.146 
Furthermore, the assumption that a hyperlink does not fall within the definition 
of public performance or display may be conceptually inconsistent with other 
authoritative U.S. case law.  Other appellate court decisions (rendered before the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Amazon) found that when an actor 
contributes to an overall process of content delivery to an end-user, that actor may 
have committed an act of public display or performance even though the actor’s 
contribution to the process did not, standing alone, result in the delivery of content 
to a user.  In other words, an actor commits a public performance or display when 
that actor carries out “any step in the process by which a protected work wends its 
way to its audience.”147  Moreover, the reasoning of more recent U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent may have implicitly cast further doubt on the logical 
underpinnings and statutory consistency of the server rule.  In a different part of the 
Supreme Court’s Aereo opinion, the Supreme Court held that an actor who takes a 
step which “simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive” an existing public display 
or performance may commit an act of public performance or display.148  If one 
concedes that a hyperlink “enhances viewers’ ability to receive” a piece of already-
available content by providing and acting on the locational information that allows 
 
 145. Id. at 2508–09. 
 146. The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently opined that this aspect of 
the Aereo decision casts doubt on the user-agnostic logic of the server rule. See Justin Goldman v. 
Breitbart News Network, LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 20--21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) 
(noting that Aereo “strongly support[s] [the] argument that liability should not hinge on invisible, 
technical processes imperceptible to the viewer” like the server location of a piece of content embedded 
on a website). In 2012, the French Cour de Cassation accepted a similar argument based on the user’s 
impression of the source of the work, and held that an unauthorized in-line link to a work on a third-
party website was infringing because users may have been under the impression that the content was 
located on the linking website.  See Google France v. Bac Films, Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme 
Court for Judicial Matters], civ., July 12, 2012, 11-13.666, https://perma.cc/X8DZ-PEXU. 
 147. NFL v. Primetime 24, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000).  See also David v. Showtime/The 
Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Congress intended the definition of 
[public performance] to encompass each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to 
[the public]”). 
 148. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506. 
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a protected work to “wend[] its way to its audience” of Internet users, it seems 
difficult to reconcile the server rule with this authority.
149
 
Given the logical and doctrinal inconsistencies underpinning the server rule, one 
might sense that other imperatives lent bad arguments more credibility than they 
deserved.  One might suspect that a desire to avoid imposing direct copyright 
liability on the widespread practice of Internet hyperlinking may have motivated 
the adoption of the rule in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.  The lower court in the Perfect 10 
litigation noted that a contrary result would “ensnare AOL, Dell, Microsoft, and 
Netscape” with unexpected copyright liability, and other commentators had noted 
(before the Perfect 10 v. Amazon decision) that imposing direct liability on links 
 
149.     The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently suggested that the server 
test could be limited to the facts of the Perfect 10 case.  See Justin Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, 
LLC., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 22--24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018). The court opined that “even if 
[Perfect 10] correctly interprets the [Copyright] Act,” the server test could be read narrowly because the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding was “heavily informed by . . . the fact that the defendant operated a search 
engine, and the fact that the user made an active choice to click on [a thumbnail] image [in the Google 
Image search results] before it was displayed.”   In other words, the court suggested that there may be a 
fundamental difference between (i) a search engine which presents users with clickable links (i.e. the 
“thumbnail” images in Google’s Image Search results) which, when clicked, summon an image from a 
third-party server, and (ii) a website which simply embeds the same image on a homepage and presents 
the image to the user “whether he or she asked for it, looked for it, clicked on it, or not.”  Id. at 23. 
However, neither the function of the defendant website (search engine or ordinary webpage) nor the 
“active choice” of the user to activate an embedded link should have any relevance to the direct 
infringement question. 
First, the court’s suggestion that different rules may apply to search engines has no basis in the text or 
legislative history of the Copyright Act. The court suggested that the purpose behind Google’s use of the 
copyrighted images (to provide an internet search service) was relevant to the question of whether 
Google “displayed” the images, pointing to a portion of the lower court’s opinion in Perfect 10 in which 
that court stated that “[m]erely to index the web so that users can more readily find the information they 
seek should not constitute direct infringement.” Id. (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 
844 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). However, while the purpose and character of a search engine’s use of 
copyrighted images may be relevant to the fair use question, see Perfect 10. v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 
1164 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that “Google’s use of thumbnails is highly transformative” because a 
search engine “transforms the image into a pointing directing the user to a source of information”), and 
the status of an online service provider as an “information location tool” may be relevant to whether the 
site qualifies for safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) 
(establishing a safe harbor for “[i]nformation location tools”), nothing in the language of the Copyright 
Act suggests that such a consideration should be relevant to the interpretation of the definitions of 
“public display” or “to transmit” for the purposes of direct infringement analysis. 
Second, the court’s attempt to distinguish websites which display embedded content only after a user 
activates an embedded link (as was the case in Perfect 10), and pages which display embedded content 
without user activation (e.g. a blog with an embedded image) conflicts with the court’s interpretation of 
the Aereo decision. The Goldman court noted that because the users in Perfect 10 could view the full-
size images only “after clicking on one of the thumbnails,” Google Image Search was better 
characterized as “a service whereby the user navigated from webpage to webpage, with Google’s 
assistance,” which is “manifestly not the same as opening up a favorite blog or website to find a full 
color image awaiting the user, whether he or she asked for it, looked for it, clicked on it, or not.” 
Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF at 23 (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. 
Supp. At 843). However, even though Google Image Search users must click on a “thumbnail” image 
before Google displays a framed image from the source website, Google still presents the framed image 
to the user within the context of its own website --- the user is not made aware that by clicking a 
thumbnail image, the user has called up an image from a third-party server. And as the Goldman court 
notes earlier in its opinion, the Supreme Court’s Aereo decision establishes that such “mere technical 
distinctions invisible to the user should not be the lynchpin on which copyright liability lies.” Id. at 21. 
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would “have far-reaching limiting effects on the development of the World Wide 
Web” and that such a rule would impose liability on “every online service provider 
directly linking to copyrighted works.”150  
However, by responding to these concerns with a broad rule that precludes any 
direct liability for linking, the Ninth Circuit may have overlooked the possibility 
that other areas of copyright law could have alleviated these unwanted outcomes.  
Section 512(d) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a safe 
harbor for actors who may otherwise have infringed copyright through the use of 
“information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or 
hypertext link.” 151   The Ninth Circuit could have recognized that actors who 
provide hyperlinks may be found directly liable for copyright infringement under 
the correct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, but that those 
defendants may claim protection under the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions by 
proving compliance with the DMCA’s safe harbor qualification requirements.152 
Statutory safe harbors to one side, even were U.S. courts to abandon the server 
rule, other issues remain for resolution before a court rules that a link to 
unauthorized content constitutes a violation of the § 106 display, performance, or 
distribution rights.  Even assuming that a hyperlink is part of the “process” through 
which content is delivered, it is not clear whether the “process” itself must be 
realized (through an ultimate delivery of the content, beginning with the activation 
of a link) or whether it would suffice for that delivery merely to be incipient.  In 
other words, is there a public performance or display if a link is simply posted, but 
never clicked?  With respect to the exclusive right of distribution of a work in 
copies, U.S. case law is inconsistent on the question whether a violation of the right 
requires proof of an “actual download,” or whether the “making available” of 
access to an online copy is sufficient to support an infringement claim. 153  By 
contrast, case law suggests that for claims of infringement of the public display or 
performance rights, the plaintiff need not prove that an Internet user in fact 
 
 150. Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 841(quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12B.01[A][2] (2005)); Matthew C. Staples, Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 80–81 (2003). 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (emphasis supplied). 
 152. Qualifying for the DMCA’s safe harbor requires that the defendant prove compliance with the 
particular requirements of the specific claimed safe harbor, which will be discussed below.  See infra 
Section III.C. 
 153. Compare London-Sire Records v. Does, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding 
that “evidence and allegations, taken together, [can be] sufficient to allow a statistically reasonable 
inference that at least one copyrighted work was downloaded at least once” and that this inference is 
“sufficient to make out a prima facie case” of infringement), with Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 
554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that “[t]he general rule, supported by the great weight 
of authority, is that infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either 
copies or phonorecords”), and Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243–45 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the distribution right guaranteed by the Copyright Act may be infringed by 
an offer to distribute, although merely alleging that files were made available, without alleging that they 
were also distributed, is not enough to state a claim). For extensive analysis of the legislative history of 
the 1976 Copyright Act contending that offers to distribute constitute actionable distribution, see 
generally Peter Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the 
Internet Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (2012). 
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accessed the file at issue.  The Copyright Office takes the position that the 
definition of to perform or display a work “publicly” “is properly construed” to 
reach “offers to stream, rather than just completed transmissions,” even though the 
issue has not been “squarely resolved by courts.”154  This interpretation arguably is 
inconsistent with the statutory language, whose reference to the receipt of a 
transmission in the statutory definition of public performance or display could 
suggest a completed transmission.155  On the other hand, interpreting the statutory 
definition to preclude prospective receipt of performances or displays of works of 
authorship would create tension between that interpretation of the definition section 
and other sections of the Copyright Act, which cover both completed and incipient 
transmissions.156  Moreover, such an interpretation would set the U.S. at odds with 
the international norm:  as we have seen, the “making available” right in the WCT 
and WPPT unambiguously covers prospective communications. 157   When the 
meaning of the domestic norm is in doubt, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory 
construction directs courts to interpret U.S. law consistently with the nation’s 
international obligations.158 
b. The Server Rule and Its Implications for In-line Linking 
Many software experts have long argued that the principle of “universal free 
linking” is fundamental to the proper functioning of the World Wide Web. 159  
Before Perfect 10 v. Amazon, legal scholars noted their opposition to the use of 
copyright or other legal regimes to impose liability for linking, which they believed 
 
 154. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 37; see also Cmty. Broad. Serv. v. Time 
Warner Cable, LLC, No. 07-139-B-W, 2008 WL 3200661, at *9–10 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2008) (noting that 
the plaintiff alleging a performance “to the public” need only allege that the transmission “was capable 
of being viewed by a substantial number of people,” and that the plaintiff “need not prove that a 
substantial number of people actually viewed the challenged transmission”). 
 155. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining public performance and display as a transmission “to the public 
. . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”) (emphasis supplied). 
 156. For example, Section 506 of the Copyright Act provides for criminal penalties for any person 
who commits an infringement “by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, 
by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew 
or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.”  17 U.S.C. § 506 
(emphasis supplied).  As David Carson, former General Counsel of the U.S. Copyright Office, has 
pointed out, “[i]t is hard to fathom how this language can be read as anything other than Congress telling 
us, in the form of an amendment to the copyright statute, that the distribution right includes the act of 
making copies available.”  David O. Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available: 22nd 
Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135, 160–61 (2010). 
 157. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 55–56. 
 159. See Sableman, supra note 1, at 1275 (describing the views of Tim Berners-Lee, one of the 
first software experts to develop the internet protocol, who believed that “[t]he universality [of free 
linking] is essential to the Web:  it loses its power if there are certain types of things to which you can’t 
link”). 
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to be antithetical to the role of a link on the Internet.160  One Internet user noted that 
“[t]o ask permission to link to a page borders on the inane.  Next, we will have the 
position that you cannot recommend a book in the local library without the author’s 
permission.”161 
However, the adoption of the “server rule” may have over-applied this principle 
by holding that even in-line links, which integrate content onto the linker’s website 
in a way that makes that content appear (to the Internet user) as if it originated on 
the linker’s website, cannot constitute direct copyright infringement.  This aspect of 
the holding of Perfect 10 v. Amazon allows any website operator freely to 
incorporate copyrighted elements from other websites (through in-line linking) 
without incurring any direct copyright liability, and has been hailed as a “major 
victory for web site operators” who need no longer worry about copyright liability 
(or seek licenses from copyright holders) when incorporating works found on other 
websites onto their own websites.162 
Such a “victory” may make it difficult for copyright owners safely to use the 
Internet to publish their works without losing control of how their works are 
presented to audiences.  If any copyrighted work, published online, can be freely 
framed on another unaffiliated and unauthorized website, copyright owners may 
lose the ability to derive advertising revenue from presenting their works on their 
own websites, as well as the ability to determine the presentational context in 
which their works appear, and the ability to derive licensing revenue from other 
websites which seek to use their copyrighted material.163  Some commentators have 
argued that legal regimes which allow unrestricted in-line linking to Internet works 
will force copyright owners to implement additional technical restrictions when 
publishing their works online, thus making them less freely available to the 
 
 160. Id. at 1276 (noting that “most Internet users see links as desirable on all sides and are puzzled 
by any legal scheme that would penalize or restrict use of such mutually beneficial indexes, roadmaps, 
and accolades”). 
 161. Id. (citations omitted). 
 162. Lee Burgunder & Barry Floyd, The Future of Inline Web Designing After Perfect 10, 17 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 17 (2008) (“[As a result of Perfect 10] a website that posts its own copyrighted 
materials cannot complain that other sites are displaying those same works as part of their offerings as 
long as those displays are made through inline web designing.”). 
 163. Letter from Nancy E. Wolff, Counsel, PACA, Digital Media Licensing Association, Inc. to 
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 15, 2014), at 4 (responding on 
behalf of visual arts trade associations to the U.S. Copyright Office’s July 15, 2014 Notice of Inquiry).  
The court in Perfect 10 did suggest that trademark law, rather than copyright law, should protect 
publishers from “acts that cause customer confusion,” indicating that the problem of “in-line linking and 
framing [which may] cause some computer users to believe they are viewing a single . . . webpage” is 
not addressed by the Copyright Act.  See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).  
The court also suggested that in-line linking or framing could “raise[] contributory liability issues.”  Id.  
Secondary liability (a doctrine of which contributory liability is a subset) will be discussed further 
below, but because claims of secondary liability must rest on an act of direct liability, secondary liability 
may not protect copyright holders from websites which in-line link to authorized display of 
performances of their works.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
192 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
public.164  Commentators have also noted that a regime which forces copyright 
owners to rely on technical restrictions to publish their works online without fear of 
unauthorized in-line linking may be unfair to “the unseasoned Internet publisher,” 
who, unlike large, commercial websites, may “not have the time, resources, 
training, or experience to thwart unwanted links.”165 
c. The Server Rule and the International Obligation to Implement the Making 
Available Right 
The server rule adopted in Perfect 10 v. Amazon may also put the United States 
at risk of falling short of its obligation to protect copyright owners’ “making 
available” right under the WCT and the WPPT.166  Some commentators have put 
forward the argument that the server rule “eviscerates” the making available right 
by allowing other websites to in-line or frame their copyrighted content without 
permission, thus divesting the copyright holders of the ability to control how their 
works are disseminated online.167  The server rule’s exclusion of deep and in-line 
linking is also at odds with our interpretation of the WIPO Treaties’ designation of 
the “place” from which members of the public choose to access works.168 
The Copyright Office noted many of these arguments in a recent report on the 
“making available” right, but simply concluded that there remained doubt about 
whether “a court might deem certain forms of inline linking or framing 
distinguishable from the technology in Perfect 10 for purposes of the server test” 
and that  “[c]onclusive resolution of these issues will require further guidance from 
courts.”169  Further guidance from courts and commentators, rejecting or at least 
questioning the server rule, may now be emerging.
170
  As a result, U.S. courts may 
 
 164. Staples, supra note 150, at 82 (“Rather than acquiring a license for copyrighted images, Web 
authors could freely code their webpages to inline link to images residing on others’ servers. Servers 
hosting popular images, particularly those of broad or general relevance, would be linked to by several 
webpages and would have to employ technological controls to prevent such linking.”).  Similar critiques 
were voiced in the EU after the CJEU extended the Svensson doctrine to in-line linking in the BestWater 
case.  See Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes, (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6KZN-L7A9; Leistner, supra note 27, at 329-30 (noting that the CJEU’s BestWater 
case, in applying the Svensson doctrine to “framed” or in-line links, may “allow[] the author’s work to 
be placed in contexts with which he or she may not agree” and thus forces an “all-or-nothing” decision 
on the original publisher, who must choose “whether he or she will prevent or permit corresponding 
linking in principle by deploying technical protective measures,” and further arguing in support of a 
recognition that all “frame links misappropriating third-party material fall under the [communication to 
the public] right” notwithstanding the “new public” criterion); see also supra notes 23–25 (discussing 
Svensson). 
 165. Staples, supra note 150, at 89. 
 166. See supra Part I. 
 167. PACA et al,. supra note 163, at 4.  See also U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 109, at 49 
(noting these arguments). 
 168. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 169. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 109, at 50–51. 
170.     In two recent cases, district courts have expressly declined to follow the server test citing 
doubts about the reasoning of the Perfect 10 decision. See supra note 99 (discussing Justin Goldman v. 
Breitbart News Network, LLC, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) and The 
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come to abandon or limit application of the server rule in a way that will bring U.S. 
copyright law in line with the WCT and the WPPT’s provisions, assuming that the 
“making available” right reaches at least some forms of linking.171 
In any event, the U.S. exclusion of direct liability for hyperlinking would not 
preclude U.S. compliance with its international obligations, so long as U.S. law 
furnished an alternative basis for effective enforcement of the exclusive rights of 
public performance and display.172  We next consider whether the U.S. doctrine of 
secondary liability, as applied to hyperlinking, sufficiently fills the gap. 
B. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Implications of Treating Hyperlinking Under Secondary Liability 
Current U.S. doctrine bars claims of direct copyright infringement for 
hyperlinking and instead addresses hyperlinking through secondary infringement 
analysis.  In the E.U., the lack of harmonization of secondary liability standards 
across E.U. member states provided the impetus for characterizing direct violations 
of the right of communication to the public to encompass at least some kinds of 
facilitation of infringement by means of hyperlinking.173  In the U.S., by contrast, 
copyright doctrine is effectively “harmonized” across jurisdictions with respect to 
both direct and secondary liability.  Albeit based in the common law, secondary 
liability for copyright infringement is a matter of federal law rather than of the laws 
of the fifty states.  Treating hyperlinking as a matter of secondary liability thus does 
not present the problem of multiple inconsistent national standards that confronted 
the CJEU. 
This is not to say that the U.S. standards for direct and secondary liability for 
copyright infringement are identical.  While direct infringement in the U.S. is a 
strict liability offense, 174  the secondary liability doctrine of contributory 
infringement requires that the secondary infringer “know[s] or [has] reason to 
know” of direct infringement. 175   The server rule thus makes a hyperlinking 
 
Leader’s Institute, LLC v. Robert Jackson, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-3572-B, 2017 WL 5629514 (N.D. Tex. 
2017)). 
171.     For example, in Goldman v. Breitbart News, Civ. No. 1:17-cv-03144-KBF, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York attempted to limit the server test to the facts of Perfect 10. See 
supra note 149 (analyzing the court’s attempt to limit the server test in Goldman). 
 172. Cf. Communication to the Public by Telecommunication:  Scope of Section 2.4(1.1) of the 
Copyright Act—Making Available, CB-CDA 2017-085 (Copyright Board of Canada, Aug. 25, 2017), at 
¶ 162 (regarding national implementation of the WCT art. 8 making available right:  “What name a right 
is given in domestic legislation does not make it any more or any less compliant.  What is important is 
that all the acts contemplated by the treaties are covered through one or more exclusive rights.”). 
 173. See supra section II.A.  See also Lyubomira Midelieva, Rethinking Hyperlinking:  Addressing 
Hyperlinks to Unauthorised Content in Copyright Law and Policy, 39 EIPR 479, 487 (2017). 
 174. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 175. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cable/Home 
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.3d 829, 845 & 846 n.29 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
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defendant’s liability turn on its actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing 
nature of the infringed work.176 
2. Secondary Liability Doctrines in the United States 
Copyright actions in the U.S. concerning secondary liability for hyperlinking 
typically allege that the defendant linked to an unauthorized source of a work 
protected by copyright.  Because U.S. courts have reiterated that there can be no 
secondary liability absent a primary infringement of copyright, 177  plaintiffs 
therefore will not succeed on secondary infringement claims based on links to 
authorized sources because the access which the link enables is not itself an act of 
direct infringement.178 
U.S. copyright law recognizes three forms of secondary liability:  vicarious 
infringement,179 contributory infringement,180 and inducement of infringement.181  
 
 176. This aspect of the secondary infringement analysis under U.S. law parallels the knowledge-
based standard which the CJEU imposed in the GS Media case.  See supra Part II. 
 177. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(“[B]oth contributory and vicarious infringements require someone to have directly infringed the 
copyright.”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).  Additionally, a 
claim of secondary infringement requires that the facilitated act of direct infringement occurs within the 
United States.  See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1091–95 (9th Cir. 
1994).  But see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 3.1, 
at 71 (2001) (criticizing the “overly rigid conception of territoriality” reflected in Subafilms and arguing 
that such a conception “may result in the conclusion that no infringement has occurred anywhere,” 
especially in the context of suits regarding “[t]he use of digital networks to transmit copyrighted works 
to individual recipients on demand, and proposing an “effects-based test of territoriality”). 
 178. In support of secondary infringement claims, some plaintiffs have advanced the theory that 
when a defendant causes (by way of hyperlink or HTML code) the plaintiff’s copyrighted work to be 
downloaded onto a user’s RAM memory, that defendant causes an act of direct infringement on behalf 
of the user, which qualifies as an act of direct infringement on which a claim of secondary liability can 
be predicated.  See, e.g., Live Face on Web, LLC v. Control Group Media Co., 150 F. Supp. 3d 489, 498 
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (“A visitor to one of Defendant’s web pages . . . download[s] a copy [of plantiff’s 
software] into his computer’s RAM, thereby infringing the [plaintiff’s] copyright.”).  Such an argument 
rests on the assumption that any user who visits any webpage commits an act of direct infringement by 
automatically downloading copyrighted works contained on the website to RAM memory, even if the 
user does not save the image to her hard drive in a more permanent form.  Not all courts accept this 
theory—in Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1169, the Ninth Circuit considered whether “[l]ocal 
caching [of copyrighted images] by the browsers of individual users” that occurs when a user’s browser 
automatically stores the images to RAM for the purposes of displaying those images on a computer 
screen constituted a violation of the reproduction right.  The court held that “even assuming such 
automatic copying could constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use” because “[i]t is designed to 
enhance an individual’s computer use, not to supersede the copyright holders’ exploitation of their 
works.”  Id. 
 179. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 & n.9 (2005)  (“[O]ne . . . 
infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or 
limit it. . . . [A] vicarious liability theory . . . allows imposition of liability when the defendant profits 
directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the 
defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement.”). 
 180. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971) (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”). 
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Vicarious infringement lies when a defendant “profit[s] from direct infringement 
while declining to exercise the right to stop or limit it.”182  In order to prove a claim 
of contributory infringement, the copyright holder must show that the defendant 
“induce[d], cause[d], or materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of 
another” “with knowledge of the infringing activity.”183  Lastly, inducement of 
infringement may lie if the defendant takes “active steps . . . to encourage direct 
infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in 
an infringing use,” builds a business model which “confirm[s] that [the 
defendant’s] principal object” is to facilitate infringement of copyright, and takes 
no effort to limit the infringing activity resulting from its acts.184 
a. Contributory Infringement 
The contributory infringement analysis poses dual criteria:  (1) “personal 
conduct that encourages or assists” an act of direct infringement (also framed as 
“material contribution” to an act of direct infringement) and (2) actual or 
constructive knowledge of the specific direct infringement.185 
 
 181. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (holding that “[e]vidence of active steps . . . taken to encourage 
direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing 
use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe,” which may support a claim of 
secondary liability under an inducement-of-infringement theory) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 182. Id. at 914.  The doctrine of vicarious infringement developed to account for situations in 
which a defendant exercises some supervisory role over infringing actors, and benefits from that activity 
without exercising its right to stop the infringement.  Thus, the doctrine of vicarious liability is a poor fit 
for the hyperlinking context, in which the linker rarely has control over the infringing activity to which it 
links.  While it may be argued that a linker may “control” a linked-to source by simply removing the 
link, courts have held that the “control” element in vicarious infringement analysis requires the actual 
ability to stop the direct infringement.  See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1173–74 (holding that 
Google’s right to terminate a particular website’s advertising contract “does not give Google the right to 
stop direct infringement” because “an infringing third-party website can continue to reproduce, display, 
and distribute its infringing copies of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works after its” contract with Google 
ended, and thus Google could not be found liable as a vicarious infringer).  Nevertheless, some plaintiffs 
have brought vicarious infringement claims in the hyperlinking context based on the theory that the 
defendant’s website users committed an act of direct infringement (by visiting defendant’s website and 
automatically downloading the plaintiff’s copyrighted works which were framed on that website to 
RAM memory), and that the defendant, as the operator of the website, had the right and ability to stop 
these acts of user-infringement by altering the website.  See, e.g., Live Face on Web, LLC v. Howard 
Stern Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 08-2579, 2009 WL 723481, at *2–4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009).  
These cases are rare, and such a theory of vicarious liability may ultimately fail because courts have held 
that the automatic downloading to RAM of a work by an Internet user simply for the purposes of 
browsing the Internet is fair use.  See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1169 (holding that “even 
assuming such automatic copying could constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use” because “it is 
designed to enhance an individual’s computer use, not to supersede the copyright holders’ exploitation 
of their works.”). 
 183. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162. 
 184. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 926, 936.  See also Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1171 (“[U]nder 
Grokster, an actor may be contributorily liable for intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the 
actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement.”). 
 185. Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Under the contributory liability doctrine, even the provision of a “simple link” 
could constitute an act of secondary infringement if that link “encourages or 
assists” an ultimate act of infringement. 186   In most of the reported cases 
concerning secondary liability for hyperlinking, courts have found that providing a 
hyperlink to an unauthorized source, in addition to some “encouraging” activity, 
satisfied the “personal conduct that encourages or assists” or “material 
contribution” requirement.  For example, in Pearson Education, Inc. v. Ishayev, the 
court found that a defendant who sold unauthorized versions of educational 
materials online and provided the materials to its customers by providing links to 
file sharing sites through which the infringing materials could be downloaded 
“plainly” carried out “conduct that encourages or assists in copyright infringement” 
and could thus be found contributorily liable.187  In Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. 
Utah Lighthouse Ministry, a defendant who had posted hyperlinks to third-party 
websites which offered infringing copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted material on 
blog posts encouraging readers to download the materials was held to have 
“materially contributed” to the acts of direct infringement carried out by the third-
party websites.188 
It may be true that the reported cases do not concern “pure” acts of hyperlinking 
(i.e. the mere provision of a link, without any encouragement to use the link).  
Because most of the U.S. precedent on contributory liability for linking concerns 
some additional “encouraging” activity (i.e. encouraging users to click a link on a 
blog post, as in Utah Lighthouse, or selling a customer access to a link, as in 
Ishayev), it is theoretically possible for a defendant who merely provided a link to 
argue successfully that the provision of a link alone does not rise to the level of 
“material contribution” to an act of direct infringement.  However, some courts 
have noted that acts which “facilitate access to websites throughout the world can 
significantly magnify the effects of otherwise immaterial infringing activities,” 
which supports the assumption that the mere provision of a link to an unauthorized 
source (which necessarily facilitates and expands access to that source) itself can 
constitute a material contribution to the underlying act of direct infringement.189 
The second element, actual or constructive knowledge, is more complex.  The 
knowledge standard for contributory infringement analysis is “an objective one; 
 
 186. For example, if the provided simple link takes the user to the homepage of a website 
aggregating links to unauthorized sources which the user must then navigate to access the infringing 
content on the third-party sites, the link provider’s act could constitute an act of contributory 
infringement (or inducement of infringement) if her act “induce[d], cause[d], or materially contribute[d] 
to the infringing conduct of another” “with knowledge of the infringing activity.”  Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162. 
 187. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 9 F. Supp. 3d 328, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[S]ending 
hyperlinks that permit others to download protected materials would plainly amount to conduct that 
encourages or assists in copyright infringement.”). 
 188. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294-95 (D. 
Utah 1999) (granting an injunction after finding that defendants “actively encouraged the infringement 
of plaintiff’s copyright” by posting three download links and by providing further instructions to a user 
on how to browse the material after one of the links didn’t work). 
 189. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1172. 
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contributory infringement liability is imposed on persons who ‘know or have 
reason to know” of the direct infringement. 190   Generally, the analysis of the 
knowledge standard will consist of two inquiries:  First, can the plaintiff prove that 
the defendant has specific knowledge of the particular works to which it is alleged 
to have facilitated access (in contrast to a defendant who may not be aware of the 
particular acts of infringement which it is facilitating)?191  Second, can the plaintiff 
prove that the defendant had knowledge that the acts it facilitated were 
infringements of copyright?  In most notable contributory liability cases, these two 
inquiries collapse into one—for example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.192 
the court assumed that Napster was aware that the files it was helping its users 
distribute were infringing versions of copyrighted songs, and focused instead on 
whether Napster had “specific information which identifie[d] infringing 
activity.”193  Because the Napster organization maintained a central index of all the 
files shared on its system, the court was able to conclude that Napster had reason to 
know of the specific instances of infringement which were occurring on its 
platform (and thus “fail[ed] to remove the material and thereby stop [infringing 
copies] from being distributed,” which satisfied the actual knowledge element).194 
Therefore, inquiry into whether the defendant had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the particular works to which its offending hyperlink facilitated 
access will supply the first step in the analysis of knowledge for claims of 
contributory liability by hyperlink.  Because the provision of a deep or in-line link 
is, in most cases, an act that relates specifically to one particular source and one 
particular copyrighted work (and not an act that facilitates large number of potential 
 
 190. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the Fourth Circuit has held that 
contructive knowledge will not suffice to support claims of contributory liability, absent a finding of 
actual knowledge or willful blindness. See BMG Rights Mgmt (US) LLC v. Cox Comm’ns Inc., No. 17-
1353, 2018 WL 650316 at *8--*11 (4th Cir. Feb. 1 2018) (holding that a contributory infringement 
claim requires actual knowledge of, or willful blindness to the facilitated acts of infringement, and that 
“negligence does not suffice to prove contributory infringement”). In BMG Rights Mgmt v. Cox, The 
Fourth Circuit based this conclusion on the observation that “Grokster’s recitation of the [knowledge] 
standard — that “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct 
infringement” — is on its face difficult to reconcile with a negligence standard.” Id. at *9 (quoting 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 914). However, many commentators frame the Grokster opinion as the 
introduction of a “new theory of secondary liability for copyright infringement” rather than a 
modification of the actual-or-constructive-knowledge standard under traditional contributory liability 
analysis. See, e.g. Evan F. Fitts, Note, Inducement Liability for Copyright Infringement Is Born: The 
Supreme Court Attempts to Remedy the Law's Broken Leg with a Cast on the Arm, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 767, 
779 (2006). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning 
the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 
584 (2008) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sony Sheep] (noting that “the [Grokster] Court declined to analyze 
what the standard for contributory infringement would be when intent to foster infringement cannot be 
shown”). 
 191. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a computer 
system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such 
material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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infringements through the provision of a platform, as in the Napster case), the 
linker will necessarily know which works it is targeting. 
In cases which involve linking to websites which aggregate infringing content 
(e.g. sites which aggregate online sources of infringing works of films and 
television content), defendants may be able to argue that they lack the 
particularized knowledge of the specific works available through the linked-to 
website.  In such cases, the defendant’s generalized knowledge that some 
infringement occurs on the linked-to website may not suffice to meet the actual or 
constructive knowledge predicate to liability for contributory infringement.  
However, even if plaintiffs fail to prove that the defendant had particularized 
knowledge of the specific works available through the linked-to site, plaintiffs still 
may proceed under the doctrine of inducement of infringement, which furnishes a 
way to impose liability on defendants who lack particularized knowledge but who 
take “active steps” to encourage infringement.195 
Nonetheless, in most hyperlinking cases (aside from cases involving links to 
aggregators, which we address further below), the “knowledge” analysis will most 
likely focus on whether the defendant had knowledge that the source to which it 
linked was unauthorized.  Because, in most instances, the actor’s knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the linked-to source has been obvious from the factual record, 
courts so far have not needed to grapple with this criterion.196 
In cases in which the defendant’s knowledge of the infringing nature of the 
source is not so clear, litigants may argue that a court should presume knowledge of 
the infringing nature of the linked-to source.197  In several cases, plaintiffs have 
argued that identifying characteristics of a website or the nature and format of the 
copyrighted work itself should form the basis of a presumption that the defendant 
knew or should have known that facilitating access to that website constituted the 
facilitation of copyright infringement.  For example, in EMI Christian Music 
Group, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, a copyright owner argued that defendant knew, or 
should have known, that the songs shared on its online music service were 
 
 195. See supra section III.B.2.b (addressing inducement of infringement). 
 196. For example, in Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 9 F. Supp. 3d 328, 337–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 
the court could safely assume that the defendant knew that the hyperlink in question linked to an 
infringing source because the defendant was in the business of selling unauthorized copies of 
educational materials; and in Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 
1290, 1294–95 (D. Utah 1999), the defendants clearly knew that the linked to materials were infringing 
because they had previously posted the materials to their own website and were ordered to remove them 
on the basis of copyright infringement. 
 197. In the U.S., presumptions of knowledge of the infringing nature of the work are typically 
based on the nature of and circumstances surrounding the allegedly infringing act—U.S. courts have not 
adopted a presumption of knowledge of the infringing nature of the work based solely on the 
commercial nature of the defendant’s acts.  Compare Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media 
Neth. BV, at 6 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6 (“[W]hen the posting of hyperlinks is 
carried out for profit, it can be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary 
checks to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those 
hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the 
protected nature of that work and the possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the 
copyright holder.”). 
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infringing and unauthorized.198  In that case, the Second Circuit held that the jury 
could reasonably conclude that the evidence presented at trial proved that the 
defendant “knew that major music labels generally had not even authorized their 
music to be distributed in the format most widely available” on defendant’s 
platform, and that this supported a finding that the defendant had “knowledge of, or 
was willfully blind to, the infringing nature of” certain well-known songs shared on 
its platform.199  However, in Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, a copyright owner made a 
similar argument, and asked the court to presume that a web-hosting provider knew 
that it was facilitating infringing activity by providing services to websites with 
domain names which hinted that the sites’ infringing nature (e.g. “illegal.net” and 
“stolencelebritypics.com”).200  The court disagreed, holding that the incriminating 
names “may [have been] an attempt to increase their salacious appeal” and 
reasoned that the defendant may have been justified to assume that the 
incriminating names were not “an admission that the photographs [contained on the 
websites were] actually illegal or stolen.”201 
However, in the context of hyperlinking, it may be easier for a court to presume 
that a linker knew of the infringing nature of the linked-to work.  First, in some 
cases, one may presume the infringing character of the linked-to site from the 
nature of the copyrighted work contained on the site. 202   For example, a site 
offering a stream of a newly released film for free may be presumed to be 
unauthorized simply because, as a matter of public knowledge, such works are not 
offered to the public for free by their copyright owners.  Second, the copyright 
owner could notify the defendant of the infringing nature of the work to which the 
 
 198. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 199. Id. at 92–93.  Note that this reasoning was a part of an analysis of whether the defendant 
qualified for safe harbor under § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and did not 
concern whether the defendant was liable as a contributory infringer.  However, the analysis of § 512 
safe harbor liability is closely related to the analysis of secondary liability.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 200. Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 201. Id.  Similarly, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), the copyright holder argued that the defendant, the provider of an online website that 
aggregated links to websites through which users could download mp3 files of songs, should be 
presumed to have known about the infringing nature of the sites which its website linked to simply 
because some of the linked-to websites used the terms “free,” “mp3,” or “file-sharing” in their domain 
names.  The court rejected this argument, finding that “those terms are ubiquitous among legitimate sites 
offering legitimate services.”  Id.  Note that the courts’ analysis in both Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC and 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, like the court’s analysis in EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. 
MP3tunes, LLC, concerned the defendant’s eligibility for DMCA safe harbor, and did not concern the 
knowledge requirement under the contributory liability doctrine. 
 202. See, e.g., EMI Christian Music Grp. v. MP3tunes , 844 F.3d at 92–93 (concluding that 
evidence that the defendant “knew that major music labels generally had not even authorized their music 
to be distributed in the format” through which defendant’s file sharing platform helped to distribute 
songs was sufficient to conclude that the defendants had “knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the 
infringing nature of the” the songs on its servers); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 
2d 537, 546–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that “a reasonable juror could—but need not—find that the 
infringing [nature of videos uploaded to a video hosting site containing well known songs] was 
‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”). 
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defendant links with a notice, which may suffice to meet the knowledge 
requirement under the contributory liability analysis.203 
b. Inducement of Infringement 
Liability for inducement of infringement is a variant of contributory 
infringement, whose elements the U.S. Supreme Court detailed in a case involving 
the liability of operators of P2P platforms:  (1) “[e]vidence of active steps taken to 
encourage direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing 
how to engage in an infringing use,” e.g. “aiming to satisfy a known source of 
demand for copyright infringement,” (2) failing to attempt to “diminish the 
infringing activity,” and (3) building a business model that is structured around 
infringing use.204  In a case concerning inducement liability of the operator of a 
BitTorrent “tracker” platform, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
defendant had “active[ly] encourag[ed] the uploading of [infringing] torrent files,” 
“acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations by the use of” its service, “took 
no steps to . . . diminish the infringing activity,” and ran a business model based on 
benefitting from infringing activity.205  One significant difference between liability 
for supplying the means to infringe (through traditional contributory or vicarious 
liability) and liability for inducement concerns the level of required knowledge.  
While U.S. courts have demanded a showing of specific knowledge regarding the 
works whose infringement the defendant facilitated,206 in the case of inducement, 
by contrast, U.S. courts have ruled that proof of intent to promote infringement 
sufficed to make out the violation, without requiring that the defendant knew 
precisely which works would be infringed. 
The inducement of infringement doctrine is likely to prove most useful when the 
link at issue leads to a site on which multiple works are accessible (i.e. a website 
which aggregates links to online sources of infringing copies of film or television 
content).  Plaintiffs who fail to prove that the defendant-linker had particularized 
 
 203. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 3205399 at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 
27, 2011) (holding that “we . . . have no doubt that defendants knew or should have known” of the 
infringing nature of the works which the defendants facilitated access to because the copyright owner 
“sent at least seven DMCA notices that identified specific infringing files” and sent several emails 
informing the defendant of the infringing nature of the files).  The sending of these “take-down” notices 
implicates the issue of whether the defendant can claim safe harbor under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, which is addressed below.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (holding that a “service provider shall 
not be liable [for copyright infringement] by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an 
online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using . . . hyperlink text . . . if the 
service provider . . . (1)(C) upon obtaining [knowledge that the material or activity is infringing], acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material”).  Therefore, by sending a notice to the 
linker, the copyright owner may be able to (1) ensure that the defendant must either take the link down 
or face disqualification from the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, and (2) ensure that she will be able to 
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the infringing nature of the linked-to source for purposes of 
proving affirmative liability. 
 204. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005). 
 205. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 206. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, 487–89 
(1984); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–22, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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knowledge of the specific works accessible on that site may still succeed if they can 
show that the defendant-linker “active[ly] encourage[d]” the infringement, “acted 
with a purpose to cause copyright violations” through the provision if the link, 
“took no steps to . . . diminish the infringing activity” by removing the link, and ran 
a business model based on benefitting from the infringing activity which was 
facilitated by the link at issue.207 
In many instances, then, doctrines of secondary liability will cover much of the 
ground left open by U.S. copyright law’s exclusion of direct liability for 
hyperlinking.  But, in the online context, both direct and secondary liability claims 
now encounter assertions of service provider immunity under the 1998 Online 
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitations Act.  To determine what secondary 
liability claims for hyperlinking might survive the act’s liability preclusions, we 
now address the terms and implementation of the statutory “safe harbors.” 
C. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND SAFE HARBOR UNDER 
U.S. LAW 
Remedies in the United States for copyright infringement by means of 
hyperlinking may also depend on the applicability of several safe harbor 
provisions, which, like the E.U. eCommerce Directive,208 provide immunity from 
copyright infringement under certain circumstances.  The United States enacted the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998, which includes several 
provisions designed to “create a series of ‘safe harbors[]’ for certain common 
activities of service providers.”209  Through these safe harbor provisions, titled 
“Limitations on liability relating to material online,” Congress sought to provide 
“greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for 
infringements that may occur in the course of their activities.”210  As the Senate 
report indicates, in acknowledging the occurrence of infringements and the 
resulting “legal exposure,” the DMCA safe harbor provisions do not in fact exclude 
liability for copyright infringement but instead limit the remedies available against 
defendants for both direct and secondary copyright infringement.211  
The law creates four safe harbors which allow qualifying “service providers” 
immunity from claims of copyright infringement:  subsection 512(a) establishes a 
safe harbor for “transitory digital network communications” (which applies to 
providers of Internet access); subsection 512(b) establishes a safe harbor for 
“system caching” (or temporary storage of material); subsection 512(c) establishes 
a safe harbor for “information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of 
 
 207. Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1036–37. 
 208. Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, at 16. 
 209. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998).  The safe harbor provisions passed with the DMCA are 
separately referred to as The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA).  See 17 
U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d). 
 210. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998). 
 211. Id. at 40 (“The limitations in [§ 512] subsections (a) through (d) protect qualifying service 
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement.”). 
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users” (which generally applies to websites that store information provided by 
users); and subsection 512(d) establishes a safe harbor for “information location 
tools” (such as links to content on other sites, typically applied to search 
engines).212 
Subsections 512(a) and (b) will not apply to hyperlinking liability cases because 
these provisions limit remedies only with respect to infringements occurring “by 
reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, 
material through a system or network,” (§ 512(a)) “by reason of the intermediate 
and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or 
providing connections,” (§ 512(a)) or “by reason of the intermediate and temporary 
storage of material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider” (§ 512(b)).  Additionally, because section 512(c) applies only to 
service providers who may be liable for infringement of copyright “by reason of the 
storage . . . of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated 
by or for the service provider,” this provision may be equally unhelpful to 
defendants who are facing liability for linking to material stored on a third-party 
server.213 
Subsection 512(d), however, shields the service provider from awards of 
damages for copyright infringement “by reason of the provider referring or linking 
users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by 
using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or 
hyperlink text.”214  When passing this provision, Congress noted that “information 
location tools are essential to the operation of the internet” because they enable 
users to “find the information they need.”215  The legislative history specifically 
refers to search engines and online directories like Yahoo! as examples of 
information location tools covered by the act, and noted that the “human judgment 
and editorial discretion exercised by [directory-based information location tools]” 
makes these services valuable.216 
 
 212. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 233, 235 (2009). 
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis supplied).  However, a defendant who both hyperlinks and 
engages in other functions which could fall under the other DMCA safe harbor provisions may claim the 
protection of multiple safe harbor provisions.  17 U.S.C. § 512(n); see also S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 55 
(“Consider, for example, a service provider that provides a hyperlink to a site containing infringing 
material which it then caches on its system in order to facilitate access to it by its users.  This service 
provider is engaging in at least three functions that may be subject to the limitation on liability:  
transitory digital network communications under subsection (a), system caching under subsection (b), 
and information location tools under subsection (d).”). 
 214. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d). 
 215. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 58 (1998). 
 216. Id.  Some commentators have noted that this legislative history may support the argument that 
the application of § 512(d) is limited to providers of search engines or directories.  See Anjali Dalal, 
Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment Values on the Internet, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1017, 1072 (2011) (noting that the definition of “service provider” and the scope of § 512(d) is 
expansive, but the legislative history’s specific discussion of online directories may be “somewhat more 
limiting”).  But see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097–98 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that § 512(d) is limited to websites “which provide links to millions of 
websites with whom it has no relationship,” and acknowledging that § 512(d) could apply to a website 
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Very few cases in the U.S. have dealt with the applicability of the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provisions to claims for copyright infringement based on hyperlinks, posted 
by the defendant, to copyrighted material.  The majority of cases involving the § 
512(d) safe harbor provision involve defendants who provide online platforms on 
which users post hyperlinks.217  Most § 512(d) cases concerning defendants who 
themselves provided the links at issue involved defendants who operate search 
engines and online directories, similar to the actors contemplated in the DMCA’s 
legislative history.218  However, in a few instances, courts have applied § 512(d) to 
defendants who do not provide search engines or directories, but who instead 
simply provide a handful of hyperlinks to websites, some of which may have 
contained infringing material.219  
3. Basic Requirements for Qualification for DMCA Safe Harbor under § 512 
Because the DMCA safe harbors provide affirmative defenses, the burden of 
proof is on the defendant to establish compliance with the statutory requirements 
for safe harbor qualification.220  Several requirements apply to any party seeking to 
claim safe harbor under the DMCA. 
First, the party must establish that it is a “service provider” as defined by the 
statute.221  The statute defines the term “service provider” (for the purposes of § 
512(b)–(d)) as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of 
 
which “merely links to a relatively small universe of websites with whom it has in place contractual 
relationships and established review procedures”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 481 F.3d 
751 (9th Cir. 2007); Amy Blom, Search Engines and § 512(d) of the D.M.C.A., 1 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. 
TECH. & INTERNET 36, 44–45 (2009) (“[A]lthough large search engines and directories like Google or 
Yahoo! seem to be what Congress had in mind when it passed the law, this safe-harbor might apply even 
if a search engine hosts a small number of links and has some form of contractual relationship with 
linked third-party sites.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Totally Her Media, LLC v. BWP Media USA, Inc., No. CV1308379ABPLAX, 
2015 WL 12659912, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (holding that a defendant which provides a “web-
based social media and community discussion forum” which “contains substantial amounts of user-
generated content, including user-generated links to outside content” was protected from copyright 
liability under § 512(d)); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 
2013) (discussing and ultimately rejecting the § 512(d) safe harbor claim brought by the defendant who 
operated a torrent-based file sharing platform). 
 218. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04–9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059, 
at *13 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (holding that Google was entitled to safe harbor under § 512(d) for a 
subset of the claims at issue, and was therefore partially shielded from liability for providing hyperlinks 
through its search engine to websites which hosted unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted 
works). 
 219. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1083, 1097–98 (applying § 512(d) safe harbor to 
a website that provides age verification services to adult websites by asking users who wish to visit 
those websites to verify their age and then providing those users with a link to websites which allegedly 
contained infringing material); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1179–
83 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying § 512(d) in a similar case, but denying safe harbor because of deficiencies 
in the defendant’s compliance with the qualification requirements). 
 220. Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1039; WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 221. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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facilities therefor.”222  This definition is “intended to encompass a broad set of 
Internet entities”223 and most likely covers any website on the Internet.224 
Second, the party must have “adopted and reasonably implemented, and 
inform[ed] subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or 
network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances 
of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who 
are repeat infringers.”225  This provision has three basic requirements:  first, a 
service provider must “adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service 
access for repeat infringers,” second, a service provider must “inform users of the 
service policy,” and third, the service provider must “implement the policy in a 
reasonable manner.” 226   The application of this “repeat infringer policy” 
requirement to hyperlinking cases is not clear.  The statute protects service 
providers who offer platforms that other parties may use to infringe copyrighted 
works (i.e. video hosting platforms, to use a commonly litigated example).  The 
repeat infringer policy seems designed specifically to ensure that “those who 
repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for the 
intellectual property rights of others” are informed by service providers that their 
access may be revoked if the infringing activity continues.227 
The framework of the DMCA’s “repeat offender policy” requirement seems 
inapplicable to a case in which a website seeks DMCA safe harbor to immunize 
itself from copyright liability for its provision of a link to a website with which the 
defendant does not have a pre-existing relationship.  In such cases, there are no 
“subscribers or account holders” to “inform . . . of the service policy.”228  Courts 
have held that when a defendant is claiming DMCA safe harbor for a service that 
lacks “account holders or subscribers,” simply providing proof that the defendant 
has a “system for receiving and processing notifications” is sufficient to meet the 
“repeat offender policy” requirement.229  Thus, this requirement may not apply in 
 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
 223. Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 224. One court commented that the definition of “service provider” is so broad that the court 
“[had] trouble imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions.”  In 
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 
2003) (emphasis in original); see also Sam Bayard, Embedded Video and Copyright Infringement, 
DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Jul. 10, 2007), https://perma.cc/MFL3-9FJW (“The plain language of § 
512(d) seems to provide bloggers and website operators who embed infringing video content with a 
means for avoiding liability.”). 
 225. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
 226. Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 227. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998). 
 228. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A); Wolk, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
 229. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (“Google has provided evidence that it has a system for receiving and 
processing notifications . . . Moreover, Google points out . . . that [its] Web Search [and] Image Search 
[products] do not have account holders or subscribers, . . . and [plaintiff] does not content that Google 
must, or even can, have a repeat infringer policy for these services.”). 
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full force to hyperlinking cases, as long as the defendant complies with the notice-
and-takedown procedures for dealing with DMCA notifications.230 
Third, the party must “not interfere with standard technical measures used by 
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.”231  The statute defines 
“standard technical measures” as “technical measures” that:  
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and 
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; (B) are 
available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not 
impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems 
or networks.232   
However, as of 2017, this provision has not been used to disqualify a service 
provider from DMCA safe harbor because of the lack of a “broad consensus” 
regarding the definition of “standard technical measures.”233 
4. Specific Requirements for Qualification for Safe Harbor Under § 512(d) 
Sections 512(c) and (d) of the DMCA impose additional qualification 
requirements on host and search engine service providers who seek safe harbor 
under those provisions.  These provisions require that the service providers do not 
have actual or “red flag” knowledge of the infringing nature of the material to 
which the service provider facilitates or provides access, that the service providers 
do not “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in 
a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity,”234 and that the service provider complies with the notice-and-takedown 
procedures laid out in § 512(c) by “responding expeditiously to remove, or disable 
 
 230. See supra discussion of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).  See also Miquel Peguera, When the Cached 
Link Is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 589, 614 (2009) (arguing that the § 512(d) “repeat offender policy” 
requirement may not apply to search engines which “lack . . . subscribers or account holders”). 
 231. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 232. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
 233. See U.S. Copyright Office, Section 512 Study: Request for Additional Comments, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 78636, 78641 (Nov. 8, 2016) (“[S]ince passage of the DMCA, no standard technical measures have 
been adopted pursuant to section 512(i).”); Capitol Records, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that the defendant’s privacy settings “prevent copyright owners from collecting information 
needed to issue a takedown notice” constitutes the failure to implement a ‘standard technical measure’ 
because privacy settings are not a “standard technical measure,” and while privacy settings “may be 
relevant to other provisions of the DMCA . . . privacy settings do not constitute interference with 
standard technical measures”.). 
 234. In the linking context, defendants will rarely have the “right and ability” to control the 
infringing activity of the unauthorized sites they link to.  See Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 
1173-74 (2007) (holding that Google’s right to terminate a particular website’s advertising contract 
“does not give Google the right to stop direct infringement” because “an infringing third-party website 
can continue to reproduce, display, and distribute its infringing copies of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works 
after its” contract with Google ended, and thus Google could not be found liable as a vicarious 
infringer).  Therefore, this provision is not immediately relevant to our analysis. 
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access to” material once that material is identified in a “notification of claimed 
infringement” provided to the service provider.235 
Actual or “Red Flag” Knowledge Requirement—Sections 512(c)(1)(A) and 
512(d)(1) require that the defendant seeking safe harbor under § 512(c) or (d) prove 
the absence of actual or “red flag” knowledge of the infringing nature of the 
activity at issue.236  The defendant: 
(A) [must] not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing; (B) in 
the absence of such actual knowledge, [must not be] aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent [i.e. “red flag” knowledge]; or (C) upon 
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material.237   
This provision parallels the analysis of affirmative liability under contributory 
liability analysis; at first blush, a defendant who possesses actual or constructive 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the facilitated activity would under 
contributory liability doctrine accordingly fail to qualify for the § 512(c)(1)(A) or § 
512(d)(1) safe harbor.238 
Courts construing the DMCA, however, have underscored a difference between 
common law standards of contributory liability and the statutory regime under the 
DMCA.239  Importantly, the statutory language of the DMCA includes both “a 
subjective and an objective element”—the defendant can be disqualified from the 
safe harbor if the plaintiff can show that the defendant had either “actual 
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing” (the subjective element) or 
“aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” 
(the objective element). 240   The Second Circuit has clarified that “the actual 
 
 235. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d). 
 236. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A), 512(d)(1). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Some commentators have noted that “the threshold requirements for [DMCA] immunity 
closely track the traditional elements of secondary liability.”  Ginsburg, Sony Sheep, supra note 190 at 
591.  See also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1371–72 (2004) (noting that the DMCA’s safe harbor 
provisions “essentially mirror[]” the tests for contributory and vicarious liability and therefore offer 
“little protection to innovators against secondary liability claims”).  But see Amy Blom, supra note 216, 
at 48–49 (“[F]or contributory infringement purposes, the ‘fatal’ knowledge imputed by courts might be a 
somewhat less stringent standard than the actual or constructive knowledge required for a search engine 
to lose its safe-harbor treatment under § 512(d)(1)(A-B).”). 
 239. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
the lower court’s argument that the defendant’s potential “liability for contributory and vicarious 
infringement renders the [safe harbor provisions of the] Digital Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable 
per se”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 238, at 1372 n.102 (“The standard of knowledge that a provider 
must have to fall outside the protections of the safe harbor may be somewhat higher than the standard 
required in an ordinary action for contributory infringement, so the safe harbor may offer some 
incremental protection even against claims of contributory infringement.”). 
 240. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998) (“The “red flag” test has both a 
subjective and an objective element.  In determining whether the service provider was aware of a “red 
flag,” the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be 
determined.  However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a “red flag”—in other 
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knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew 
of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider 
was subjectively aware of facts that would have made specific infringement 
“objectively” obvious to a reasonable person.”241  However, under either standard, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had subjective or objective knowledge of 
specific instances of infringement, rather than a mere “general awareness that there 
are infringements”—courts have labeled this as the “specificity requirement.”242  
Therefore, the DMCA standard may require plaintiffs to prove more than they 
would otherwise have to prove to meet the knowledge standard under contributory 
liability analysis.  Rather than proving that defendant knew, or should have known 
of the facts and circumstances making infringement obvious, the plaintiff must 
prove actual, subjective knowledge of those facts and circumstances to disqualify a 
defendant from safe harbor under the DMCA’s “red flag” knowledge standard.  
One commentator noted that, absent proof of subjective “actual” knowledge of 
infringing material, “[red flag] knowledge can never be found unless a plaintiff 
produces evidence which can demonstrate both the specificity of infringing 
material as well as a clear indication of the content’s illicit nature.”243 
Courts also point to § 512(m), which bars courts from requiring that a service 
provider “monitor[] its service or affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing 
activity”244 to limit the grounds on which a defendant can be disqualified from § 
512(c) safe harbor on the basis of “red flag” knowledge.  Because of the explicit 
“no monitoring obligation” language in the DMCA, the protections of the DMCA 
safe harbor may be broader than the affirmative liability standard under 
contributory liability doctrine—in other words, it may be possible for a defendant 
to qualify for safe harbor under § 512(c) or (d) even when that defendant might 
otherwise have been found liable for contributory infringement. 
A comparison between the cases A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.245 and 
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC 246  illustrates the differences between the 
 
words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the 
same or similar circumstances—an objective standard should be used.”). 
 241. Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis supplied). 
 242. Id. at 30-31 (quoting Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).  See also id. at 31 (“The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between 
specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard.”).  
Courts have noted that this “specificity requirement” can be implied from the removal provisions of the 
DMCA, which require providers to “act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” 
once learning of its infringing nature.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), 512(d)(1)(C); Viacom Intern. 
Inc., 676 F.3d at 30 (“[T]he nature of the removal obligation itself contemplated knowledge or 
awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service 
provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”). 
 243. Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory Under § 
512(c)’s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 85, 141 (2013). 
 244. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1); see also Viacom Intern., Inc., 676 F.3d at 41 (“[T]he safe harbor 
expressly disclaims any affirmative monitoring requirement—except to the extent that such monitoring 
comprises a ‘standard technical measure’ within the meaning of § 512(i).”). 
 245. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 246. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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contributory liability “knowledge” analysis and the § 512(c)/(d) “knowledge” 
analysis.  In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, record companies and music publishers 
sued Napster, an Internet service that allowed the peer-to-peer transmission of 
digital audio files.  The court ruled that Napster had “both actual and constructive” 
knowledge of the direct infringements that its platform enabled.  The Ninth Circuit 
found that Napster had actual knowledge of direct infringement because (1) 
Napster maintained a directory of all the files shared on its system which gave it the 
ability to “learn of specific infringing material available on [its] system,”247 and (2) 
because several documents introduced to the record conclusively showed that 
Napster executives had been informed of some specific infringing files which were 
available on its system, and had full knowledge that its users were “exchanging 
pirated music.”248  The court further agreed with the lower court’s finding that 
Napster had constructive knowledge of direct infringement, based on its 
observations that “(a) Napster executives have recording industry experience; (b) 
they have enforced intellectual property rights in other instances; 
(c) Napster executives have downloaded copyrighted songs from the system; and 
(d) they have promoted the site with ‘screen shots listing infringing files.’”249  In 
other words, knowledge that Napster executives were generally aware that mass 
infringement occurred on their platform, combined with Napster’s clear ability to 
identify infringing activity through its central directory, was sufficient to support a 
claim of contributory liability. 
In Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,250 a group of record companies and 
music publishers sued Vimeo, an online video sharing platform, asserting that 
Vimeo was hosting infringing content on its platform.  Vimeo claimed safe harbor 
under § 512(c).251  The plaintiffs had presented evidence that some of Vimeo’s 
employees had watched and interacted with some videos which contained “all or 
substantially all” of recognizable copyrighted songs, and argued that this should 
disqualify Vimeo from § 512(c) safe harbor because the evidence established 
Vimeo’s possession of “red flag” knowledge of the infringing content.  The 
plaintiffs also presented evidence that Vimeo employees knew that many of the 
videos on the platform contained infringing content (this evidence was very similar 
to the evidence presented in the Napster case), and that Vimeo employees had, “in 
order to expand its business, actively encouraged users to post videos containing 
infringing material.”252  Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that Vimeo had monitored 
videos for infringement of visual content, but had declined to monitor its videos for 
infringement of audio content, which proved that Vimeo at least had the technical 
 
 247. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. 
 248. Id. at 1020 n.5 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016) 
 251. Id. at 81. 
 252. Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. Vimeo, L.L.C., 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting 
evidence that Vimeo employees had sent emails internally indicating that the company “[i]gnor[es]” the 
fact that many videos on the platform use copyrighted material, and noting that another employee had 
responded to a question regarding Vimeo’s copyright policy by telling a user “[d]on’t ask, don’t tell;)”). 
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ability to identify specific infringing material. 253   The court rejected these 
arguments and found that the evidence presented was insufficient to show that 
Vimeo was disqualified from claiming § 512(c) safe harbor.  The court reasoned 
that § 512(m) “relieves the service provider of [the] obligation to monitor for 
infringement posted by users on its website,” and thus Vimeo’s “awareness of facts 
suggesting a likelihood of infringement” did not “requir[e] investigation merely 
because [Vimeo had] learn[ed] facts raising a suspicion of infringement.”254  The 
court’s decision was primarily motivated by a concern that, when designing the 
DMCA safe harbor provisions, Congress had intended to “[p]rotect[] service 
providers from the expense of monitoring” for infringing content.”255 
Therefore, evidence that may be sufficient to support an argument of “actual or 
constructive knowledge” for contributory infringement purposes may be 
insufficient to disqualify a defendant from claiming the protections of DMCA safe 
harbor on the basis of actual or “red flag” knowledge.  In both Napster and Vimeo, 
the plaintiffs had presented evidence which established (i) that the defendant had at 
least some general knowledge that infringement occurred on its platform,256 and 
(ii) that the defendant had the ability to identify infringing content and remove it.  
However, while this evidence was sufficient to support a finding of affirmative 
liability in Napster, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the 
defendant was disqualified from seeking the protections of DMCA safe harbor in 
Vimeo.  Thus, at least with respect to the knowledge requirement, the protections 
provided to service providers under the DMCA seem to be broader than the 
defenses to allegations of liability for contributory copyright infringement. 
Two recent developments in DMCA case law may, however, signal that courts 
are retreating from this broad reading of the safe harbor provisions.  First, in 
Viacom v. YouTube, the Second Circuit recognized that plaintiffs may meet the 
disqualifying “knowledge” standard under the DMCA through arguments based on 
the doctrine of willful blindness.257  Despite the absence of any mention of willful 
 
 253. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98. 
 254. Id. at 98.  See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 
1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[I]f investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to identify material as 
infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”). 
 255. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98. 
 256. In another case, plaintiff’s evidence that showed that 75–80% of all videos on defendant’s 
platform contained copyrighted material, and that “defendants were conscious that significant quantities 
of material on [their] website were infringing” did not suffice, standing alone, to prove that the 
defendant “actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that would indicate, the existence of 
particular instances of infringement” for the purposes of § 512(c) eligibility analysis.  See Viacom 
Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 257. Id. at 35. After Grokster, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that that a claim for affirmative 
contributory liability must rest on a showing of either actual knowledge of, or willful blindness to 
specific acts of direct infringement, and that constructive knowledge or negligence will not suffice. See 
BMG Rights Mgmt (US) LLC v. Cox Comm’ns Inc., No. 17-1353, 2018 WL 650316 at *8--*11 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 1 2018); see also supra note 190. Combined with the Second Circuit’s embrace of the willful 
blindness theory in the context of the knowledge standard for DMCA safe harbor analysis, see Viacom, 
676 F.3d at 35, this approach implies that the knowledge standards for affirmative liability and for safe 
harbor qualification are indeed parallel. 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
210 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
blindness in the DMCA’s statutory language, the court ruled that  a defendant who 
becomes “aware of a high probability of [its facilitation of infringement] and 
consciously avoided confirming that fact” may be disqualified from DMCA safe 
harbor under the actual or red flag knowledge provisions. 258   Because willful 
blindness is a “proxy for knowledge,” willful blindness must too relate to “specific 
infringements”—in other words, willful blindness of facts that would lead a 
reasonable observer to have a generalized knowledge of infringement will not 
suffice to disqualify a party from DMCA safe harbor.259 
Plaintiffs may thus be able to “avoid difficulties in proving apparent knowledge” 
by simply proving that the defendants were aware of the high probability of the 
infringing nature of a specific facilitated act, and deliberately avoided learning 
additional facts which could have confirmed the infringing nature of that act.260  
Notably, the concept underlying willful blindness may cut against a broad 
interpretation of § 512(m) of the DMCA that would relieve the service provider of 
any obligation to investigate specific acts of infringement.261  Accordingly, courts 
have applied the willful blindness doctrine conservatively.  For example, in Capitol 
Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, the Second Circuit refused to apply the doctrine of 
willful blindness to a defendant who had shown the ability to monitor its platform 
for infringing content, but declined to monitor in a way which would reveal 
infringements of plaintiff’s copyrights, even though the plaintiffs had presented 
evidence that proved that the defendant was generally aware that its acts facilitated 
copyright infringement.262 
Second, recent case law suggests that in some circumstances, service providers 
may in fact have affirmative obligations to monitor for infringing activity—and that 
the “no monitoring obligations” language in § 512(m) of the DMCA forbids the 
imposition only of general duties to monitor.”263  In EMI Christian Music Group v. 
MP3tunes, LLC, a copyright holder had produced evidence which showed that 
defendants, who operated an online music service on which users posted links to 
 
 258. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35. See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 
F.Supp.2d at 1116. The doctrine of willful blindness may have roots in the DMCA’s legislative history.  
See H.R. REP. 105-55(II) at 57 (1998) (noting that a service provider would not qualify for safe harbor 
“if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement”); Columbia Pictures Inds. v. Fung, 
2009 WL 6355911 at *17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (quoting this language in order to find that the 
defendant was disqualified from DMCA safe harbor because he had overlooked facts which would have 
made specific instances of infringement apparent).  
 259. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 99 (quoting Viacom Intern., 676 F.3d at 34–35). 
 260. Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory Under § 
512(c)’s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 85, 154 (2013). 
 261. See, e.g., Viacom Intern., 676 F.3d at 35 (noting the tension between willful blindness 
doctrine and § 512(m), and stating that while § 512(m) is “incompatible with a broad common law duty 
to monitor or otherwise seek out infringing activity based on general awareness that infringement may 
be occurring,” willful blindness doctrine does not necessarily impose “an affirmative duty to monitor” 
and thus § 512(m) does not prevent a narrow application of the willful blindness doctrine to DMCA 
cases). 
 262. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98. 
 263. EMI Christian Music Group, v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 844 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis 
supplied). 
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mp3 files, knew (i) that their service allowed users to share mp3 versions of Beatles 
songs, and (ii) that “there had been no legal online distribution of Beatles tracks 
before 2010.”264  The Second Circuit concluded that the jury below was “permitted 
to conclude that [defendants had] a time-limited, targeting duty—even if 
encompassing a large number of songs,” and implied that only an “amorphous” 
duty to monitor constituted a “contravention of the DMCA[‘s § 512(m) 
provision].”265  Notably, the Second Circuit also paid particular attention to the 
observation that implementing this “time-limited, targeted duty” would be 
relatively easy for the defendant:  the “design of the service’s indexing feature, 
coupled with the readily ascertainable and searchable nature of certain categories of 
infringing material” meant that the imposition of a limited monitoring duty would 
not be overly burdensome.266 
While these recent developments may imply that courts are reconsidering their 
initially broad interpretations of the DMCA safe harbor provisions, the “no 
monitoring obligation” provision (§ 512(m)) may stunt the reach of the novel 
approaches based on “willful blindness” and “time-limited, targeted dut[ies].”  
Therefore, while there is significant doctrinal uncertainty surrounding this issue, 
when a defendant is not actually aware of the infringing nature of the facilitated 
activity, is not aware of “facts making [a specific instance of] infringement 
obvious,”267 and does not consciously avoid acquiring knowledge of these facts, a 
plaintiff will most likely fail to disqualify the defendant from DMCA safe harbor 
based on the knowledge provisions.  In other words, a defendant who has only 
general knowledge that its actions facilitate infringement, and who declines to 
implement its ability to identify and remove specific infringing content may still 
qualify for DMCA safe harbor, even though that defendant might have otherwise 
been found liable under affirmative contributory liability doctrine.268 
Thus, in the hyperlinking context, the analysis of a defendant’s knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the linked-to source may be more defendant-friendly under the 
DMCA safe harbor analysis than under general principles of contributory liability.  
Because the DMCA case law establishes that the defendant is required to 
investigate whether a particular facilitated act is illicit only when it learns of “facts 
making infringement obvious” (rather than when it learns of facts that “rais[e] a 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. This logic has been used to find that a service provider who ran a platform which enabled 
users to upload photographs, after receiving take down notices identifying specific infringing 
photographs, had a targeted duty to monitor for other “substantially similar or readily identifiable” 
copies of those photographs uploaded by other users after the initial infringing images were taken down. 
Venus Fashions, Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc., 2017 WL 2901695 at *27 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18 2017) (citing 
EMI Christian Music Group, 844 F.3d at 93). 
 266. Randi W. Singer & Jonathan Bloom, Second Circuit Examines Limits of DMCA Safe-Harbor 
Protection, 29 NO. 2 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 7 (2017); EMI Christian Music Group, 844 F.3d at 
93 (“[T]here was evidence at trial that MP3tunes could disable access.  Indeed, an expert testified that 
searching through libraries of MP3 songs was a common function of MP3tunes’s business.”). 
 267. Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 98. 
 268. See, e.g., supra discussion of Capitol Records, 826 F.3d 78; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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suspicion of infringement”), it may be relatively easy for a defendant linker to 
claim the benefits of the § 512(d) safe harbor as long as the defendant does not 
know of the infringing nature of the linked-to source, and does not possess 
knowledge of (nor is willfully blind to) facts or circumstances which would make 
the infringing nature of the linked-to source obvious to a “reasonable person.”  
Moreover, the legislative history of § 512(d) indicates that courts should be 
particularly careful when assuming the existence of “red flag” knowledge for the 
purposes of determining whether a defendant qualifies for the “information location 
tools” safe harbor under the DMCA.  The House Report which accompanied the 
DMCA clarified that “[t]he knowledge or awareness standard [contained in § 
512(d)] should not be applied in a manner which would create a disincentive to the 
development of directories which involve human intervention” and that “[a]bsent 
actual knowledge, awareness of infringement as provided in [§ 512(d)] should 
typically be imputed to a directory provider only with respect to pirate sites or in 
similarly obvious and conspicuous circumstances, and not simply because the 
provider viewed an infringing site during the course of assembling the 
directory.”269 
Compliance with Notice-and-Takedown Procedures—To qualify for § 512(d) 
safe harbor, a party must also comply with the notice-and-takedown procedures 
laid out in § 512(c)(3).270  After receiving a proper notice from a copyright holder, 
the party seeking safe harbor must “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity.”271  In order for a notice to be proper, the notice must meet the 
detailed statutory requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv)–(vi),272 “identif[y] . . . the 
reference or link” at issue, and provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the service provider to locate that reference or link.”273  A notice that complies 
“substantially” with these requirements may suffice to give the defendant 
“knowledge” of the work, thus disqualifying it from the safe harbor if it does not 
remove the material at issue.274  While the § 512(c) safe harbor provision requires 
the party seeking safe harbor to designate an agent “to receive notifications of 
claimed infringement,” § 512(d) does not require designation of an agent.275 
 
 269. H.R. REP., supra note 258, at 58. 
 270. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (requiring compliance with the notice-and-takedown procedures laid 
out in § 512(c)(3)). 
 271. Id. The statute does not define “expeditiously” and Congress noted in the DMCA legislative 
history that “[b]ecause the factual circumstances and technical parameters may vary from case to case, it 
is not possible to identify a uniform time limit for expeditious action.”  S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 44 
(1998). 
 272. Id. at § 512(c)(3)(A)(i), (iv)–(vi) (requiring the notice to include a signature, contact 
information of the copyright holder or its agent, a statement of “good faith belief that use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized,” and a “statement that the information in the notification 
is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the 
[copyright holder]”). 
 273. Id. at § 512(d). 
 274. Id. at § 512(c)(3)(B). 
 275. Id. at § 512(c)(2).  This might not be clear from the statutory language—§ 512(d) incorporates 
§ 512(c)(3), which does refer to a “designated agent.”  See id. at § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (referring to “the 
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After the service provider receives the notice and “remove[s], or disable[s] 
access to” the identified link, § 512(g) sets out a procedure through which the 
service provider may be required to replace the removed or disabled link.276  While 
§ 512(g) refers to § 512(c) and not § 512(d), courts have held that § 512(g) applies 
in equal force to takedown procedures under § 512(d).277  
However, it is unclear how the replacement procedures set out in § 512(g) apply 
to § 512(d) defendants who do not have a pre-existing service relationship with a 
“subscriber[] or account holder[].”  § 512(g) requires that the service provider 
“takes reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or 
disabled access to the material,” and then allows the “subscriber” to send a counter-
notification which will require the service provider to restore access to the removed 
or disabled work within 10-14 days.278  However, as noted above, a defendant 
facing a claim for infringement for a link that the defendant itself provided may not 
have “subscribers or account holders” to notify of the removal of the particular 
link.279  For example, search engines and online directories seeking the § 512(d) 
safe harbor (which, by some measures, elicit the majority of all DMCA takedown 
notices280) may not have a pre-existing service relationship with the sites to which 
they link, and thus may not have an accessible way to “notify” a website that it has 
removed a link after receiving a takedown notice.281  Without a mechanism to 
notify the affected websites, the DMCA’s “counter-notification and put-back” 
procedure, which was designed as procedural protection for alleged infringers who 
 
service provider’s designated agent”).  However, the Copyright Office takes the position that only 
parties seeking safe harbor under § 512(c) need to designate an agent.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 80 
FR 81862-01, SECTION 512 STUDY: NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2015) (“A service 
provider seeking to avail itself of the section 512(c) safe harbor for user-posted content is further 
required to designate an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement.”). 
 276. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g). 
 277. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1179 (C.D.Cal. 2002). 
 278. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)–(3). 
 279. In some cases, courts have implemented 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) in the context of a hyperlink 
provider who is in privity with the websites to which the hyperlinks lead. For example, in Perfect 10, 
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1180, the court examined the defendant’s compliance with § 512(g) by 
examining the procedure through which the defendant would restore a removed link.  The defendant in 
that case was an age-verification service for adult websites, and the court considered defendant’s client 
websites as the “subscribers” for the purposes of determining whether the defendant had followed the 
counter-notification and put-back procedures in § 512(g).  However, not all providers of hyperlinks will 
have a relationship with the linked-to source site, and therefore in some § 512(d) cases there may be no 
“subscriber” to which the defendant must send a notification that the link has been removed. 
 280. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process of “Chilling Effects”? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 644 (2006) (noting that 59% of the DMCA notices studied from the “Chilling 
Effects” database were 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) notices sent to search engines, requesting removal of a 
webpage from search results). 
 281. Id. at 626 (“As search providers likely have no service relationship with the alleged infringer, 
they rarely have the ability to notify . . . . Links to complained-of material are thus typically removed 
from the search engine’s index based only on the copyright holder’s takedown notice, without any notice 
to the target or other process.”). 
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may be adversely affected by inappropriate or abusive takedown requests, may not 
operate effectively in the context of many § 512(d) service providers.282 
Google claims that, after removing content from its search engine due to a 
takedown notice, it “notif[ies] the administrator of the affected site through 
Google’s Search Console.” 283   However, not all website administrators whose 
websites are included in Google’s search results utilize the “Search Console” 
service, which is an opt-in analytics product.284  The Lumen removals database, a 
project of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, provides a 
creative solution to this problem:  search engines can forward takedown notices to 
Lumen, which publishes these notices online and provides a simple way for website 
owners to file DMCA counter-notifications.285  Search engines can respond to a 
takedown notice by breaking the link to the allegedly infringing website, and 
redirecting that link directly to the page on the Lumen website on which the 
publication of the relevant take-down notice appears.286  Through this process, even 
though a website operator may not be affirmatively notified that her link has been 
removed due to a takedown notice, the website operator may quickly learn of the 
removal and have an opportunity to respond after searching for her own site on a 
search engine. 
Some commentators have concluded that § 512(d) does not require the service 
provider to notify targets of the take-down.287  While this conclusion is not clear 
 
 282. Id. at 628 (referring to the counter-notification and put-back procedures as an “important 
procedural protection”); id. at 684 (noting the “troubling” use of questionable takedown notices by 
website operators against their competitors, and describing this practice as a “new weapon in the search-
rank wars”). 
 283. Transparency Report: Requests to Remove Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/22CH-SRWJ (“When we take action in response to a copyright notice, 
we notify the administrator of the affected site through Google’s Search Console. Following DMCA 
process, a webmaster may issue a counter notification.  If they believe the content is not infringing or 
that a notice has been filed in error, the administrator of an affected site or the provider of affected 
content may also file a counter notification.”). 
 284. Search Console Help:  What is Search Console?, GOOGLE (last visited Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/N2ZV-ZDCH (“Google Search Console is a free service offered by Google that helps 
you monitor and maintain your site’s presence in Google Search results. You don’t have to sign up for 
Search Console for your site to be included in Google’s search results, but doing so can help you 
understand how Google views your site and optimize its performance in search results.”). 
 285. Transparency Report, supra note 283 (“Lumen is a project of Harvard’s Berkman Klein 
Center for Internet & Society.  Lumen works with a variety of international research partners to offer 
information about the global landscape of Internet takedown requests. Lumen posts and analyzes 
different kinds of requests to remove material from the Internet, including requests based on copyright 
claims.”).  See, e.g., Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN 
DATABASE (last visited Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/PU9A-UD7R (publication of a takedown notice 
sent to Google requesting removal of several “allegedly infringing URLs” and inviting the owner of 
those URLs to “[c]reate DMCA Counter Notice”). 
 286. Id. (“When it is possible to do so legally, Google links from search results to the requests 
published by Lumen in place of removed content.”) 
 287. Dena Chen, Musetta Durkee, Jared Friend & Jennifer Urban, Updating 17 U.S.C. § 512’s 
Notice and Takedown Procedure for Innovators, Creators, and Consumers, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 
31, 2011), https://perma.cc/8248-FAT4 (“[S]ervice providers providing information location services, 
defined in § 512(d) . . . are not required to notify targets that their material is being taken down in order 
to maintain safe harbor protection.”); Urban & Quilter, supra note 280, at 628 (“One important 
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from the statutory language, this interpretation seems consistent with the approach 
some courts have followed when interpreting the § 512(i) “repeat infringer policy” 
requirement as applied to service providers who could not implement it because of 
their lack of “subscribers and account holders.”288  Nonetheless, the awkwardness 
of applying the full notice-takedown-put-back framework to some § 512(d) 
contexts raises concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of the DMCA’s 
procedural protections for the spectrum of online participants who may be 
adversely affected by abuse of the takedown procedures.  The counter-notification 
and put-back procedures may work appropriately for § 512(d) service providers 
who crowd-source links (i.e., sites which invite users to post links) or search 
engines who have a service relationship with the websites to which they link (i.e. 
Google and its means of communicating with linked websites through the Google 
Search Console tool).  However, to preserve eligibility for the § 512(d) safe harbor, 
websites that simply post links to content on other websites may be forced to take 
down links in response to takedown notices, and may not be able to take advantage 
of the DMCA’s put-back procedures because of the lack of a pre-existing service 
relationship with the sites to which they link.289 
 
protection for subscribers is receiving notice of the copyright holder’s complaint, which is afforded only 
to Internet subscribers of hosting services under § 512(c), and not to beneficiaries or subscribers of other 
regulated services, such as § 512(d) search services or § 512(a) Internet access providers.”).  These 
commentators apparently base this conclusion on the absence of any requirement in § 512(d) for the 
service provider to “notify targets that their material is being taken down.”  It is true that § 512(d) does 
not include this requirement, but the absence of such a provision may not mean that § 512(d) service 
providers are entirely exempt from this requirement—the requirement to “take reasonable steps 
promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed disabled access to the material” comes from 
§ 512(g) and similarly does not appear in § 512(c). 
 288. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL 9479059 at *13 
(C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (“Google has provided evidence that it has a system for receiving and 
processing notifications . . . Moreover, Google points out . . . that [its] Web Search [and] Image Search 
[products] do not have account holders or subscribers, . . . and [plaintiff] does not content that Google 
must, or even can, have a repeat infringer policy for these services.”). 
 289. While it is true that the linking service provider could simply refuse to take down the link 
after receiving a takedown notice, such a refusal may disqualify the service provider from § 512(d) 
because that provision requires the service provider to “respond[] expeditiously to remove” the 
infringing link “upon notification of claimed infringement.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).  Therefore, if the 
service provider refuses to take down a link and is subsequently sued by the copyright holder, the 
service provider would have to defend itself against a claim of secondary infringement without the 
protections of the § 512(d) safe harbor.  Because the conditions for qualifying for safe harbor may be 
more defendant-friendly than the conditions for escaping affirmative liability under contributory 
infringement doctrine, see supra notes 234-63 and accompanying text, this may disadvantage defendants 
who refuse to remove allegedly infringing links after receiving a valid takedown notice. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON 
U.S. AND E.U. HYPERLINKING LAW 
A. CONSISTENCY OF NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN REGIMES WITH INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS 
An initial question inquires “which international norms”:  should service 
provider liability limitation regimes be treated as exceptions whose consistency 
with international norms would be analyzed under the three-step test on which 
WCT art. 10 and TRIPS art. 13 condition conformity of national legislation to 
international norms?290  Or should they be considered a matter of remedies, whose 
contours Berne art. 5(2), by providing that “the means of redress afforded to the 
author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country 
where protection is claimed,” leaves to member state determination?291  Classifying 
these regimes as exceptions may condemn them to conflict with international 
norms because it is difficult to see how a regime that applies to all copyrighted 
works could be characterized as limited to “certain special cases” (step one of the 
three-step test).292  The WTO dispute resolution panel interpreting the first step has 
stated that “an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a 
qualitative sense” and “a limitation or exception in national legislation should be 
clearly defined and should be narrow in its scope and reach.”293  Service provider 
liability limitations may be “clearly defined” in that they cover all copyrighted 
works, but by the same token their reach is extremely broad.  If, as the WTO Panel 
held, an exception that does not pass the first step will fail the test as a whole, an 
exception that exceeds the scope of the first step is fatally flawed.
 294 
To avoid this result, one might interpret the first step to accommodate 
application of an exception to a broad class of works, so long as the purpose of the 
exception were very constricted, but given the significance of internet 
communications, a purpose of immunizing service providers from liability does not 
seem very narrow, either.  On the other hand, the specific prerequisites to the 
immunity might be deemed sufficient to narrow the uses subject to the exemption.  
Failing acceptance of that limiting construction, another way to salvage service 
 
 290. See WCT, supra note 6, art. 10, ¶ 1 (“Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, 
provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works 
under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”); See also Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13,  33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (1994) [hereinafter, TRIPS] 
(“Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder.”). 
 291. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 2. 
 292. See TRIPS, supra note 290. 
 293. Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶¶ 6.109, 6.112, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000).  
 294. Id. at ¶ 6.97 (“The three conditions apply on a cumulative basis, each being a separate and 
independent requirement that must be satisfied.  Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions 
results in the Article 13 exception being disallowed.”). 
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provider liability limitations would reject the WTO Panel’s seriatim approach to the 
three-step test (“Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions results in 
the Article 13 exception being disallowed”),295 and balance all steps into a general 
inquiry into market harm and social benefit.296  This approach essentially ignores 
the tripartite treaty formulation, as well as the treaty command that exceptions and 
limitations should be “confined,”297 but has the “advantage” of creating a standard 
so vague that service provider liability limitations of the kind we have seen might 
conceivably pass muster.  Even an approach that melds the three steps into one, or 
balances them against each other, might nonetheless prove dubious in the case of 
deep and in-line links because these may well conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work by substituting the linker’s advertising for a lawful source page’s 
advertisements.  Moreover, because the service provider will not be liable in 
damages, there is no remuneration right to compensate for the use under the third 
step. 
The U.S. approach appears more compatible with international norms than the 
E.U.’s because § 512 does not contest the existence of direct or indirect liability of 
service providers for copyright infringement.  Instead, it narrows the remedies 
available against infringing service providers to injunctive relief.  The exclusion of 
damages against service providers arguably comes within the leeway Berne allows 
member states.  While the Berne Convention specifies minimum remedies only 
with respect to infringing importation,298 the TRIPS Accord, art. 45(1), requires 
member states to provide damages remedies for infringement of intellectual 
property rights, but only if the infringer knew or “had reasonable grounds to know” 
of the infringement.299  Since the § 512 safe harbors apply only to linkers who 
 
 295. Id. 
 296. Much has been written on competing approaches to the three-step test.  See generally, 
MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST (2004); Christophe Geiger 
et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 707 (2008) (arguing that the three-step test “should be 
interpreted so as to ensure a proper and balanced application of limitations and exceptions”); Wittem 
Group, European Copyright Code, 1 JIPITEC 123 (2010), https://perma.cc/7ELJ-BYLL (proposing an 
alternate approach based allowing exceptions “provided that the corresponding requirements of the 
relevant limitation are met and the use does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or rightholder, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties”). 
 297. See WCT, supra note 6, art. 10; See also TRIPS, supra note 290, art. 13 (“Members shall 
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.”). 
 298. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 16. 
 299. TRIPS, supra note 290, art. 45(1) (“1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order 
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has 
suffered because of an infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who 
knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.”).  Commentators have 
interpreted this provision to require “[k]nowledge (or reasonable grounds to know) by the infringer that 
the activity was infringing.”  DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 582 (4th ed. 2012) (interpreting TRIPS art. 45(1)) (emphasis supplied).  See also Sascha 
Vander, Commentary on TRIPS Article 45, in WTO TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 718, 720 (Peter-Tobias Stoll, Jan Busche & Katrin Arend, eds., 2009) (interpreting 
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neither knew nor had “red flag” knowledge of infringement, TRIPS would not 
require awards of damages in the case of copyright infringement by reason of the 
acts covered by the limitation on remedies.300  By contrast, where TRIPS does 
mandate the availability of a damages remedy, that is, when the defendant had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, damages against the service 
provider remain available under U.S. law.  
The U.S. safe harbors thus may well fit within the Berne scheme, while the E.U. 
regime, as a system of exceptions from liability rather than limitations on remedies, 
might not.  But since the E.U. regime largely operates like the U.S. regime, 
providing for de facto private injunctions through the notice and takedown 
procedure, and for judicial injunctions by virtue of art. 8(3) of the Information 
Society Directive, condemning one while upholding the other seems an exercise in 
pure formalism.301  Perhaps the E.U. provisions, albeit labeled as prerequisites to 
non-liability, would better be conceptualized as limitations on remedies, and treated 
functionally as “means of redress” falling under art. 5(2) rather than the three-step 
test for exceptions. 
Alternatively, one might revisit the permissible contours of exceptions and 
limitations.  If the three-step test constrains the scope of exceptions to Berne-WCT-
TRIPS minimum rights, it becomes necessary to consider the Berne-WCT-TRIPS 
minimum remedies accompanying those rights.  Putting together the relevant 
provisions, TRIPS obliges member states to protect the right of communication to 
the public, 302  and requires availability of injunctive relief, 303  but mandates 
availability of monetary relief only if the infringer knowingly engaged in the 
 
the knowledge provision in TRIPS art. 45 to mean “knowledge or reasonable grounds to know . . . that 
the activity was infringing” and noting that in most circumstances, knowledge can be “assumed . . . 
where offences have been committed by the infringer after having received a warning from the right 
holder.”). 
 300. Arguably “reasonable grounds to know” would encompass a greater range of actors than 
those with “red flag” knowledge as currently interpreted by U.S. courts, but U.S. courts in the future 
might interpret that standard harmoniously with the international norm. 
 301. Article 12(3) of the eCommerce Directive also provides that Member States may provide for 
injunctive relief to “terminate or prevent an infringement.”  See Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 
12(3); Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment (Sept. 15, 2016) at ¶ 79, 
https://perma.cc/5324-W6ML (noting that Article 12 of Directive 2000/31 “must be interpreted as 
meaning that it does not preclude . . . a person from claiming injunctive relief against the continuation of 
. . . infringement . . . [facilitated by a] provider whose services were used in that infringement where 
such claims are made for the purposes of obtaining, or follow the grant of injunctive relief by a national 
authority or court to prevent that service provider from allowing the infringement to continue”). 
 302. TRIPS, supra note 285, art. 9 (mandating compliance with Berne Convention arts. 1-21).  To 
the extent the WCT making available right institutes prerogatives that go beyond the Berne 
communication to the public right, rather than merely clarifying the pre-existing scope of the 
communication to the public right, TRIPS might not require the provision of monetary or injunctive 
relief in the event of a violation of a Berne+ right.  On the other hand, art. 19 of Berne, which TRIPS 
does incorporate, requires member States to extend to works from other Berne member States any 
greater protection the country of protection provides.  Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 19. 
Arguably, TRIPS minimum remedies could apply to violations of Berne+ rights through the back door 
of art. 19. 
 303. See TRIPS, supra note 290, art. 44.  
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infringing activity.304  In other words, TRIPS allows, but does not compel, member 
states to afford a damages remedy to innocent infringers of the right of 
communication to the public. 305   It is therefore possible to argue that the 
eCommerce Directive’s liability limitation provisions, read together with the 
Information Society Directive’s imposition of injunctive relief against intermediary 
service providers, are not an exception or limitation at all under TRIPS art. 13, 
because the E.U. texts do not in fact derogate from an international obligation. 
D. COMPARISON OF E.U. AND U.S. RULES ON LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKING 
1. Lack of Liability for Linking to an Authorized Public Source 
Both the U.S. and the E.U. regimes generally preclude liability for hyperlinking 
to an authorized source on the Internet.  In Svensson, the CJEU held that even 
though hyperlinks are a “making available” and thus a “communication to the 
public,” a hyperlink that merely offers to re-communicate a work from a source 
authorized by the right holder who has made the work available to all Internet users 
(i.e. without technical restrictions or paywalls) is not “covered by the concept of 
‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2001/29,”306 because it does not make the work available to a public the right 
holder did not take into account in the initial authorized communication.  The 
CJEU expanded this “new public” principle to in-line links in BestWater Int’l 
GmBH v. Michael Mebes.307  Therefore, any hyperlink to an unrestricted site on 
which a copyrighted work has been published with proper authorization cannot 
constitute an actionable “communication to the public” because such a hyperlink 
does not communicate the work to a “new public.”  
Similarly, Perfect 10 v. Amazon's “server rule” in the U.S., to the extent it 
continues to be followed,
308
 would lead courts to reject copyright holders’ claims 
 
 304. Id. at art. 45. 
 305. TRIPS mandates no remedies for violations of the right of communication to the public 
beyond the scope of that right as articulated in the 1971 Paris text.  The right of making available was 
introduced in the 1996 WIPO Copyright treaties, which post-date TRIPS.  WCT, supra note 6, art. 8.  If 
the making available right is a “new” right, then it falls outside TRIPS.  Whether the right is in fact 
“new,” or rather a clarification of the pre-existing Berne right, is a matter of some controversy.  See 
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 8, at 127 (noting that “the making available right was 
considered to be an aspect of the communication right”); See also SILKE VON LEWINSKI, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 458 (2008) (“Under the WCT, the right of making 
available has been made a part of the right of communication to the public.”); See generally Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM R. CORNISH 234, 246 (2004) (concluding that 
“[t]he core concept of ‘making available,’ . . . can fairly be called neither a reaffirmation nor a novelty,” 
because it resolves ambiguities surrounding the Berne communication to the public right). 
 306. Case C-466/12, Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, at ¶ 24 (Feb. 13, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/7Y63-9BNE. 
 307. Case C-348/13, BestWater Int’l GmBH v. Michael Mebes, (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6KZN-L7A9. 
308.     See supra note 99 for a discussion of cases in which U.S. courts have declined to follow the 
server rule.  
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that a link to an authorized publication of their work constitutes a violation of rights 
under § 106 of the Copyright Act.309  Under the “server rule,” a hyperlink of any 
type cannot constitute a direct infringement of copyright unless the linker “store[s] 
and serve[s]” the copyrighted work from its own server  any liability for linking 
would be a matter of secondary infringement.310  But because those claims require 
an underlying act of direct infringement,311 a secondary infringement claim based 
on a hyperlink to an authorized source will fail.312 
The two regimes reach the result through different reasoning, but the result 
seems to reflect widespread concerns about the adverse consequences of imposing 
copyright liability on actors who innocently link to authorized content on the 
Internet, and to reflect a broader recognition of the importance of hyperlinks to the 
functioning of the Internet as a whole.313  On the other hand, this result both favors 
free riding by in-line linkers who run advertisements against the linked-to content, 
and raises the concern that copyright holders who make their works available on 
the Internet without technical restrictions may lose control of how their works are 
presented and disseminated.314  
2. Liability for providing a link vs. Liability for facilitating actuali access 
through a link? 
In the E.U., the CJEU’s construction of the “making available” right establishes 
that an actor incurs liability for a “communication to the public” simply by offering 
the public access to a work—a copyright holder need not prove that any member of 
the public in fact accessed the work.315  By contrast, while the weight of authority 
in the U.S. indicates that a violation of the § 106 public performance or display 
rights may require only an “offer” to perform or display a work,316 some U.S. case 
 
 309. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 310. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843-44 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 311. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(“[B]oth contributory and vicarious infringements require someone to have directly infringed the 
copyright.”); Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1169. 
 312. See supra notes 177and accompanying text (explaining this point, and noting that some U.S. 
plaintiffs have made the unsuccessful argument that by enabling an automatic download of a 
copyrighted work to a user’s computer from an authorized source website, a link to an authorized source 
does enable an act of direct infringement). 
 313. See supra notes 159and accompanying text (noting the importance of the principle of 
“universal free linking”); Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, at ¶ 
31 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9A5K-FDP6 (noting the importance of finding a “a fair balance 
between, on one hand, the interests of copyright holders . . .  and, on the other, the protection of the 
interests and fundamental rights of users of protected objects, in particular their freedom of expression 
and of information, . . . and of the general interest.”). 
 314. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns). 
 315. Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, art. 3. 
 316. See, e.g., Cmty. Broad. Serv. v. Time Warner Cable, LLC, No. 07-139-B-W, 2008 WL 
3200661, at *9-10 (D. Me. Aug. 7, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff alleging a performance “to the public” 
need only allege that the transmission “was capable of being viewed by a substantial number of people,” 
and that the plaintiff “need not prove that a substantial number of people actually viewed the challenged 
transmission.”). 
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law indicates that a violation of the distribution right might require proof of an 
actual transfer of a work; a mere “offer” to transfer a copy of the work (that is, 
making the work available for downloading) may not suffice without additional 
proof of actual downloads.317 
The following scenario illustrates the difference between liability for offering 
downloads and liability for actual downloads.  Were it necessary to prove actual 
downloads, then a U.S. copyright holder who brings a claim of secondary 
infringement on the basis of a link to an unauthorized source of a work would need 
to show completed acts at both the primary and secondary levels of infringement.  
Thus, she would be required to prove (i) that a member of the public in fact clicked 
on the URL that the defendant-linker supplied, and (ii) that the activation of the 
URL actually resulted in a distribution of the work.  If the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the defendant-linker’s URL was clicked, the defendant would argue that, even 
though the link it provided had the potential to facilitate an act of direct 
infringement, without proof of the realization of that potential, the link did not in 
fact “materially contribute”318 to an act of infringement.  Further, if the plaintiff 
failed to prove that the linked-to source actually delivered a digital copy of the 
work (rather than merely offered downloads), the defendant could invoke case law 
establishing that the “general rule” in the U.S. holds that an “infringement [of the 
distribution right] requires an actual dissemination” and thus no act of direct 
infringement has been established.319 
In practice, U.S. courts have grappled with neither of these questions in 
hyperlinking cases.  In the reported hyperlinking cases, U.S. courts typically have 
not required the copyright holder to prove that the defendant’s link enabled an 
actual distribution of the work to an Internet audience.320  Despite this oversight, 
those U.S. courts bound by precedent establishing that an “actual dissemination” is 
necessary for a violation of the distribution right should, in theory, not overlook a 
plaintiff’s inability to show that a defendant’s link actually caused the 
dissemination of a copyrighted work to a user’s computer.  That said, this tortuous 
reasoning applies only to offers to download:  U.S. authorities have not required 
proof of actual communications when plaintiffs allege violations of the rights of 
 
 317. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding 
that “[t]he general rule, supported by the great weight of authority, is that infringement of [the 
distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords”); Elektra Entm’t 
Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the distribution right 
guaranteed by the Copyright Act may be infringed by an offer to distribute, although merely alleging 
that files were made available, without alleging that they were also distributed, is not enough to state a 
claim).  But see London-Sire Records v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that 
“evidence and allegations, taken together, [can be] sufficient to allow a statistically reasonable inference 
that at least one copyrighted work was downloaded at least once” and that this inference is “sufficient to 
make out a prima facie case” of infringement).  See also supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text. 
 318. Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967 (RWS), 1998 WL 43221 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998). 
 319. Atl. Recording Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
 320. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1292 (noting that “[i]t is undisputed that 
defendants [provided] three website addresses of websites containing [plaintiff’s copyrighted works]” 
but neglecting to discuss whether any of those websites actually provided the underlying work to 
Internet users, or whether defendant’s links were actually used to access any of these source websites). 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
222 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:2 
public performance or display. 321   As a result, claims involving links to 
unauthorized streaming sites would appear to forgo the hurdles of proving either 
that the user clicked on the link or that the site in fact streamed the content to the 
user. 
3. Comparing U.S. standards for secondary liability and E.U. standards for 
direct liability 
Some commentators have observed that the CJEU’s imposition of a knowledge-
based standard after GS Media, albeit providing the basis for direct liability for 
facilitation of infringement of the right of communication to the public, in fact 
resembles a secondary or contributory infringement standard.322  As a result, even 
though U.S. courts have declined to hold linkers directly liable for infringement 
that they facilitate, and therefore address claims against linkers as matters of 
secondary liability, E.U. standards of direct liability for facilitation of infringement 
seem to parallel U.S. standards of derivative liability.  The legal standard under 
both regimes focuses on similar questions, and may reach similar results. 
Mere Supplier of Means vs. Acts of Communication / Secondary 
Infringement?—  The standard under both U.S. and E.U. law requires a 
consideration of the significance of the defendant’s action; both regimes seek to 
distinguish between actors who merely supply the means to commit acts of 
infringement and actors who take a more intentional and active role in enabling 
infringement.  In the U.S., contributory liability analysis requires an inquiry into 
whether the defendant “materially contributed” to an act of direct infringement, 
which requires more than a “‘mere quantitative contribution’ to the primary 
infringement . . . [p]articipation in the infringement must be ‘substantial.’”323  The 
CJEU has distinguished between the mere provision of facilities for making a 
communication and the performance of a more “active” or “essential role” in the 
communication.324  Case law from both jurisdictions confirms that the provision of 
 
 321. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (citing case law and the opinion of the U.S. 
Copyright Office establishing that a claim for infringement of the public display or performance rights 
does not require proof of an actual communication of the work). 
 322. Eleonora Rosati, The CJEU Pirate Bay Judgment and Its Impact on the Liability of Online 
Platforms, EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 11 (forthcoming manuscript) (on file with 
https://perma.cc/F7JJ-LCBM) (“It has been argued that, by introducing a knowledge requirement within 
the scope of primary liability, the CJEU has blurred the distinction between what has traditionally 
regarded as a strict liability tort (primary infringement) and liability informed by the defendant’s 
subjective state of actual or constructive knowledge (secondary infringement).”); See also Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The Court of Justice of the European Union Creates an EU Law of Liability for Facilitation 
of Copyright Infringement: Observations on Brein v. Filmspeler [C-527/15] (2017) and Brein v. Ziggo 
[C-610/15] (2017) 2-3 (Columbia Law and Economics, Paper No. 572), available at 
https://perma.cc/2K3X-S6WM (English translation of article appearing in French at 2016/5-6 AUTEURS 
ET MEDIAS 401 (2017)). 
 323. Livnat, 1998 WL 43221 at *3. 
 324. See Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 22, ¶ 27 (“The mere provision of physical facilities 
for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to [an act of] communication.”).  This 
language derives from the Agreed Statement to Article 8 WCT.  See WCT, supra note 6, art. 8 (“It is 
understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does 
GINSBURG AND BUDIARDJO, LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (2018) 
2018] LIABILITY FOR HYPERLINKS TO INFRINGING CONTENT 223 
a hyperlink to a location on the Internet is a sufficiently significant act to satisfy the 
threshold criterion for imposing liability on the link provider, even if the hyperlink 
merely made it easier for end-users to access a website which would have been 
available to them without the hyperlink.325 
Knowledge and Inducement—Under both U.S. and E.U. law, a defendant may 
face liability (i) if the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of the specific works 
to which it facilitated access, 326  or alternatively (ii) if the defendant actively 
induced users to access infringing works, even if the defendant did not know or 
have reason to know of the specific works to which it facilitates access.327  Thus, a 
defendant-linker who supplies a deep or in-line link could face liability under either 
regime because such a link necessarily relates to one particular source and one 
particular copyrighted work, and thus a plaintiff will be able to establish that the 
defendant knew of the specific work to which it enabled access.  And a defendant-
linker who supplies a simple link to a website which aggregates infringing content 
 
not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention.”).  
The CJEU has held that a defendant commits an “act of communication” when that defendant performs 
an “essential role” in the making available of a particular work, by “interven[ing], in full knowledge of 
the consequences of his action, to give [users] access to a protected work, particularly where, in the 
absence of that intervention, those [users] would not be able to enjoy the . . . work, or would be able to 
do so only with difficulty.”  Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV (June 
14, 2017) at ¶ 26, https://perma.cc/C3D3-AXXG. 
 325. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. courts have typically found 
that providing a hyperlink to an unauthorized source, in addition to some minimal activity encouraging 
or prompting users to use the hyperlink, suffices to constitute a “material contribution” to an act of direct 
infringement); See also Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 26 (noting that a defendant commits an act of 
communication even if, “in the absence of [the defendant’s] intervention, . . . [users] would be able to 
[access the infringing source of the work] only with difficulty”); Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Jack 
Frederik Wullems [hereinafter, Filmspeler] (Apr. 26, 2017), ¶ 49, https://perma.cc/XF7A-TE7F. 
(“[W]here it is established that such a person knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted 
provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet, the provision of that link constitutes a 
‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”). 
 326. Under traditional contributory liability analysis in the U.S., the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the specific acts of direct infringement that it 
facilitated. Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 117-18. This standard is based on specific knowledge:  the 
defendant must have known, or must have had reason to know, of the specific works which it has 
facilitated infringement of.  See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 102 (“[I]f a computer system operator learns 
of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, 
the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”).  Similarly, the Ziggo case confirmed 
that, as a matter of EU law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in “full knowledge of the 
consequences of his action,” and that a plaintiff can meet this requirement by establishing that the 
defendant could not have been unaware” of the infringing nature of the conduct it facilitated.  Ziggo, 
Case C-610/15,  ¶¶ 26, 45.  The Ziggo decision implies that evidence that the defendant “classif[ies] the 
works under different categories” and “delete[s] obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter[s] 
some content,” which necessarily establishes that the defendant had knowledge of the specific works to 
which it was facilitating access, is relevant to the knowledge analysis.  See id. ¶ 38. 
 327. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) 
(establishing the doctrine of inducement of infringement in the U.S., through which a plaintiff may 
prevail on a secondary infringement claim even if the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant knew or 
had reason to know of the specific works to which it facilitated access); Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, at 
¶¶ 50-51 (holding the defendant liable without addressing whether the defendant had specific knowledge 
of the particular works to which it facilitated access). 
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(who may not know, or have reason to know, of the particular works to which it 
facilitates access through the simple link) may face liability under either regime if 
the defendant actively induced users to use the link to gain unauthorized access to a 
copyrighted work. 
Liability for hyperlinking in both the U.S. and the E.U. also requires that the 
defendant have knowledge (actual, constructive, or presumed) of the infringing 
nature of the work to which it facilitated access.  In GS Media, the CJEU 
established a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who provides a hyperlink “for 
profit” does so “with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and 
the possible lack of consent to publication on the Internet by the copyright 
holder.”328  Thus, many plaintiffs in E.U. hyperlinking cases will be spared the 
burden of proving that the defendant (with a profit motive) knew of the infringing 
nature of the work.  
U.S. law does not recognize such a “for profit” presumption of knowledge.329  
Most U.S. hyperlinking cases have not required courts to ascertain  the defendants’ 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the work because such knowledge was 
obvious from the factual record.330  However, in cases in which the defendant’s 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the work is not so clear, plaintiffs may 
nonetheless be able to argue that the defendant’s knowledge of the infringing nature 
of the work should be presumed based on identifying characteristics of a website or 
the nature and format of the copyrighted work.331 
 
 328. Sanoma, Case C-160/15, ¶ 51. (“[W]hen the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it 
can be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that 
the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it 
must be presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that 
work and the possible lack of consent to publication on the Internet by the copyright holder.  In such 
circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink 
to a work which was illegally placed on the Internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within 
the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”).  But see supra note 69 (discussing recent German 
case law disregarding this rebuttable presumption in cases regarding the liability of search engines).  In 
Ziggo, the CJEU did not apply the rebuttable presumption of knowledge announced in GS Media, 
perhaps because it was abundantly clear that the defendant was acting in full knowledge of the illicit 
nature of the communications that it was facilitating.  See Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 45. 
 329. In general, the relevance of the commercial character of a defendant’s conduct seems much 
more significant in E.U. cases than in U.S. cases.  See Filmspeler, Case C-527/15, ¶ 34 (noting that the 
“profit-making nature of a communication, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, is 
not irrelevant”); Ziggo, Case C-610/15, ¶ 29 (same).  In the U.S., the “commercial character” of a 
defendant’s conduct may be relevant only in the context of a claim of inducement of infringement, 
which requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant built a business model structured around infringing 
use.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 936. 
 330. For example, in Pearson, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 336-39, the court could safely assume that the 
defendant knew that the hyperlink in question linked to an infringing source because the defendant was 
in the business of selling unauthorized copies of educational materials; and in Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1294-95, the defendants clearly knew that the linked to materials were infringing because 
they had previously posted the materials to their own website and were ordered to remove them on the 
basis of copyright infringement.  
 331. See supra notes 197-201 (discussing case law in which courts have considered such 
presumptions based on the names and characteristics of the works shared). 
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4. Comparing Safe Harbor regimes in the U.S. and the E.U. 
The E.U. and U.S. safe harbors also appear to operate similarly, although the 
level of knowledge that will disqualify a U.S. service provider may be somewhat 
higher, particularly given the textual disparity between U.S. law’s preclusion of a 
duty to monitor, and the E.U.’s rejection of a “general duty to monitor”332 (which, 
accordingly, leaves room for a specific duty to monitor, for example, to ensure that 
infringing content, once taken down, stays down). 333   In the E.U., the service 
provider may be obliged to take down of its own accord recurring user-posted links 
to infringing sources, while it is less clear that a U.S. copyright owner may impose 
such an obligation on a U.S. service provider.  On the other hand, while U.S. law 
includes a safe harbor specifically for the benefit of search engines and providers of 
links, the eCommerce directive requires creative judicial exposition to reach these 
actors.334  Nonetheless, the knowledge standard the CJEU has now engrafted onto a 
prima facie case of infringement of the communication to the public right by 
facilitation of infringement may well fill the gap between the activities shielded on 
the back end by U.S. law, and activities excluded on the front end by the 
knowledge requirement in the E.U.. 
 
 332. 17 U.S.C. sec c. 512(m); Directive 2000/31, supra note 75, art. 15 (emphasis supplied). 
 333. See, e.g., Rapidshare I, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, I 
ZR 18/11, 2012, ¶¶ 19 & 31 (Ger.) (holding that in “specific cases” once a right-holder informs a service 
provider of infringement, the service provider must do “everything that is . . . technically and 
economically reasonable to prevent further infringements”); GEMA v. RapidShare AG, 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12, 2013, ¶. 39 (Ger.) 
(holding that a service provider who was notified of claimed infringement was required to monitor 
content uploaded by its users to prevent further infringement).  But see Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended 
SA v. Soci. . .t. . . Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et . . .diteurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959 
(holding that a general, preventative, time-unlimited duty to monitor a system for infringements would 
violate the prohibition of general monitoring obligations under art. 15 eCommerce Directive). 
 334. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting EU cases in which courts have implied that 
search engines may be able to claim safe harbor under art. 14 eCommerce Directive). 
